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Abstract
The work presented in this thesis is directed at steganography detection in HTML files.
The most common HTML steganography methods from the literature are considered
in the thesis: (i) Attribute Permutation Steganography (APS) (ii) Invisible characters
Steganography (ICS) and (iii) Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography (TLCSS).
Steganography detection in HTML files entails two challenges. The first challenge is the
identification of the steganography features that eventually would facilitate detection.
Three features are thus proposed depending on the nature of HTML steganography
method: (i) in case of APS the change of an attribute positions in an HTML tags was
used (ii) in case of ICS the frequency distributions of white space character segments
was used and (iii) in case of TLCSS the smoothness of tag letters was used. The second
challenge is how to represent webpage content after steganography features have been
identified. Four representations were proposed in this thesis again depending on the
nature of HTML steganography method. In case of APS detection two representations
were used (i) standard deviation of a webpage attributes’ positions (ii) a feature vector
of an attribute position changes count. In case of ICS detection a feature vector of
frequency distributions of white space character segments was used. In case of TLCSS
detection a webpage is represented by two sets of tags “Regular” and “Singular” accord-
ing to a defined tag smoothness statistics. The aforementioned HTML Steganography
methods are considered in the thesis in the context of both: the dynamic (monitoring)
context and the (non-monitoring) static context. With respect to the dynamic (monitor-
ing) context the proposed Statistical Detection (SD) approach directed at APS detection
was considered. With respect to the static (non-monitoring) context all three identified
forms of HTML steganography were considered. More specifically the Attribute Position
Changes Count (APCC) approach directed at APS detection, the Detect Invisible char-
acters (DIC) approach directed at ICS, and the Tag Variance (TV) approach directed
at TLCSS. The reported evaluation indicated that good results were obtained in most
cases. In the dynamic context the results indicated that proposed SD approach was effec-
tive. In the static context both the proposed APCC and the proposed DIC approaches,
coupled with appropriate classification methods, resulted in an effective classification of
stego and non-stego webpages. Also in the same context the proposed Tag Variance was
effective at detecting very short messages that were embedded using TLCSS.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The work presented in this thesis is concerned with methods for HTML steganography
detection. Steganography is an information hiding technique intended to provide covert
communication in such a way that no one but the sender and receiver are aware of the
communication’s existence. Steganography requires a carrier, a container or a cover,
used by the steganographer to carry the hidden message. The main requirement for a
carrier is that its usage for steganographic purposes should not attract any third party
attention, in other words any hidden message should not be visible to a casual observer.
Steganography has been used in many forms since ancient times, however the advent of
the Internet in modern times has significantly increased the scope for its usage.
Internet services provided many benefits, services that include, but are not limited
to, abundant information and resources, communication without borders, entertainment
and eCommerce. The Internet, despite its many benefits, has also provided a mecha-
nism for unethical and criminal behavior and activity, including providing a conduit for
steganography. Digital media, available through Internet services, for example images,
video, audio files and documents, all provide a carrier for steganography. This digital
media includes redundancy in various forms that can be used for the purpose of message
hiding. For example image files can be easily distorted so as to hide a message whilst,
so far as an unsuspecting observer is concerned, the image remains unchanged.
Network protocols provide another form of a carrier for steganography, as do web-
pages. Webpages are accessed frequently on daily bases, therefore they are ideal for
usage as a cover for steganography because accessing of webpages will not cause any
suspicion. Webpages are written using HTML (Hyper Text Markup Language) some
of whose features provide an excellent opportunity for steganography, so called HTML
steganography. HTML steganography can be achieved in a variety of ways, for example
the addition of white space characters, switching letter case and alternating the ordering
of tag attributes, can all be used for the purpose of steganography without changing the
way that WWW pages are rendered by a web browser. There are many freely available
1
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tools to support HTML steganography [42, 49]. The work presented in this thesis is
directed at the detection of HTML steganography.
Steganography does have legitimate applications. For example the copyrighting of
intellectual property by including (say) serial numbers in digital films, audio recordings
and books [7]. Other legitimate applications include: feature tagging and time stamping
of images of various kinds, and military and security applications where unobtrusive
communication is required. Examples of non-legitimate usage of steganography include:
criminal communication, data smuggling and industrial espionage [100].
Closely related to the legitimate use of steganography is watermarking [17, 31]. Wa-
termarking is frequently used with respect to images available for purchase over the
Internet so as to prevent their illicit usage. Once purchased the image is sent without
the watermark. The distinction between watermarking and steganography is that water-
marking is not intended to be unobtrusive as in the case of steganography. The emphasis
is on robustness. In the case of watermarked images, the watermark must be resistant
to various forms of transformations such as rotation, compression and cropping.
Another way of sending information that can only be deciphered by a sender and
receiver, although much more obtrusive, is data encryption [13, 71]. The distinction
with steganography is that steganography is used to hide the existence of a message,
while cryptography is used to hide the content. To provide an extra layer of security the
stenographer can of course also encrypt the hidden messages. The work presented in this
thesis is directed at steganography detection, and is not concerned with cryptography or
watermarking (although a relationship clearly exists between cryptography and water
marking, and the process of steganography).
Given the above, the advantages offered by steganography, to the steganographer,
can be summarized as follows:
• Secrecy of both the sender and receiver’s identities.
• Avoidance of the need to use encryption; some countries prohibit the transmission
of encrypted messages [5, 92].
• The hiding of messages very existence (unlike in the case of cryptography).
Steganography detection is concerned with identifying the presence of steganography;
and, in some cases, by extension, also the extraction of hidden messages [15] [63]. The
work presented in this thesis is directed at HTML steganography detection. In the
context of steganography detection the term steganalysis is also used in the literature.
Both terms, are used in this thesis and are assumed to be synonymous. In the literature
the term steganalysis is sometimes used to describe processes whereby the security and
robustness of steganography algorithms are assessed [11, 40]. So as to prevent confusion,
in this thesis, the term steganalysis will only be used in the context of steganography
detection.
The structure of the reminder of this introductory chapter is as follows: In Section
1.2 the motivation for the research is presented in more detail. The research question
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and associated research issues are then discussed in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 outlines
the research methodology adopted to address the research question and the associated
issues, followed in Section 1.5 with an itemization of the research contributions. Section
1.6 presents details of published work produced as a result of the presented research,
followed in Section 1.7 with an outline of the structure of the remainder of this thesis.
1.2 Research Motivation
As already noted above, the Internet is an open public access network which provides
many benefits while also facilitating some undesirable activities, one of which is the
provision of an illicit communication channel whereby hidden messages can be sent and
received. One mechanism for doing this is by using steganography, the process of hiding
messages within some cover messages in such a way that the cover message, at least to
an unsuspecting observer, remains unchanged.
Although, as also noted above, steganography does have legitimated usages, it also
has undesirable usages. Steganography has been used in the context of malware, malware
such as Duqu and Alureon, both directed at capturing information from the infected
system and unobtrusively transferring this information back using innocent images as
the carrier [100]. The usage of steganography by terrorists was suspected during the lead
up to the 9/11 attack in the USA [56, 57]. There is also an evidence of a Russian spy ring
using digital images as a cover to pass classified information from the USA to Moscow
[86]. Simply by monitoring the number of times, running to hundreds of thousands,
that steganography tools are downloaded, is an indicator of the scale of stegongraphy
usage [84, 85](for example 59737 downloads of openPuff 4.00 tool for steganography and
watermarking and 9825 downloads of SteganoG 1.130.0 tool for steganography using
BMP files/ last updated Dec. 2017).
Given the above there is a need for techniques to detect the presence of steganog-
raphy. The motivation for these techniques is to uncover unauthorized covert mes-
saging. As noted above, webpages are an ideal carrier for steganography, specifically
HTML steganography. However, steganography detection (steganalysis) in the context
of HTML steganography has received very little attention in the research literature.
The motivation for the work presented in this thesis can therefore be summarized as
follows:
1. The increasing prevalence of steganography as witnessed by the number of times
steganography tools have been downloaded from the Internet.
2. Following on from (1) the corresponding requirement for comprehensive steganog-
raphy detection tools and methods.
3. The lack of steganography detection tools directed at HTML steganography, de-
spite the suitability of HTML encoded webpages as a carrier for steganography.
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1.3 Research Question
Given the above motivation the work presented in this thesis is therefore directed at
techniques for detecting the presence of steganography in HTML files (HTML steganog-
raphy). The overriding research question is thus:
“What are the most appropriate detection approaches, dynamic and static, required to
efficiently and effectively detect hidden messages in HTML files?”
The term dynamic used here refers to the process of continuously monitoring webpages,
while the term static refers to the process of applying steganography detection techniques
to webpages in an oﬄine manner.
To provide an answer to the above research question the following research sub-questions
need to be considered:
1. What are the features of steganography that can best be adopted to facilitate
detection?
2. How can steganography detection effectiveness be measured so that different tech-
niques can be assessed and compared to one another?
3. Given a set of webpages how should the content of those webpages be represented
so as to facilitate, dynamic or static, steganography detection?
4. Given a solution to the above, how can the performance of such techniques be best
improved so as to maximize effectiveness?
5. What is the most appropriate mechanism for webpage monitoring in the context
of dynamic steganography detection?
6. What is the effect on detection of the nature of messages that are hidden (English
language or random)?
7. What is the effect on detection of the length of messages that are hidden?
1.4 Research Methodology
To provide an answer to the above listed research issues, and overriding research ques-
tions, the start point for the work presented in this thesis, was to review established
methods for HTML steganography. From this review three HTML steganography tech-
niques were identified: (i) Attribute Permutation Steganography (APS) [45, 80, 81] (ii)
Invisible characters Steganography (ICS) [60, 91] and (iii) Tag Letters Case Switching
Steganography (TLCSS) [87, 96]. Each of these is to be considered in turn and im-
proved detection techniques (over existing techniques) identified. At the same time the
proposed detection techniques will be considered in both the static (non-monitoring) and
the dynamic (monitoring) contexts. To identify appropriate detection mechanisms the
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
broad strategy adopted is to consider mechanisms founded on the concept of machine
learning [2, 41]. More specifically, classification mechanisms, whereby binary classifiers
(stegnography exists versus does not exist) can be learnt from labeled training data
where data records (webpages) had been seeded with hidden messages using identified
HTML steganography techniques. Once learnt, the classifier could be applied to new,
previously unseen webpages, and these webpages are classified according to whether
steganography is suspected or not. There are a number of benefits that the classifica-
tion approach offered which led to its adoption. Firstly, the approach is well established
and well documented. Secondly, classification approaches have well founded mechanisms
for establishing their effectiveness which could easily be adopted (including statistical
significance testing). Thirdly, that there was very little previously reported work where
classification has been used for HTML steganography detection. For the building of the
classification models three classification algorithms are considered: (i) Neural Network
(ii) Support Vector Machines and (iii) Naive Bayes; these were all taken from the WEKA
machine learning toolbox [32].
Classification algorithms typically operate using a feature vector representation as
the input. This means that webpages needed to be represented in this format so that
classification algorithms can be applied. Thus work is required on how such representa-
tions could be generated given the different HTML steganography techniques available.
The idea was to test the classification models with and without feature selection, al-
though not in all cases. The “CfsubsetEval” attribute evaluation algorithm [3] together
with a best-first search strategy are used.
For evaluation purposes Ten-fold Cross Validation (TCV) is typically used through-
out. The evaluation measures used are average accuracy and AUC (Area Under the
receiver operator characteristic Curve). To determine whether the results obtained are
statistically significant a comprehensive statistical analysis of the results is conducted
using Friedman test (followed by Nemenyi post-hoc test) for comparing several classifi-
cation models (more than two) and Wilcoxon-signed rank test for comparing two related
samples [23]. In this statistical analysis the effect on steganography detection of both
the type and length of embedded hidden messages was also considered. Note that the
“type” of a hidden message, as used here, refers to whether the message is in English
language or some other form.
As already noted above, it is considered desirable to investigate steganography de-
tection both in the dynamic (monitoring) and the static (non-monitoring) contexts by
considering two different scenarios. In more detail:
• Dynamic (Monitoring) scenario: For the dynamic scenario a number of “copies”
of a webpage is collected over sample intervals of time τ over a period of time T .
A sequence of “webpage snapshots” is thus obtained. The scenario is designed to
simulate the process whereby webpages might be monitored for the presence of
steganography.
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• Static (Spot Check) (Non-Monitoring) scenario: In this case only one snap-
shot per webpage is used for determining whether steganography is present or not.
This scenario is designed to simulate the situation where a “spot check” is con-
ducted.
To support the analysis a number of algorithms needed to be developed, whereby HTML
steganography can be conducted, based on existing HTML steganography methods and
techniques reported in the literature. These algorithms needed to be able to embed
both English language and random text into selected HTML files, and messages of dif-
ferent length, so that a comprehensive analysis of the proposed steganography detection
techniques could be conducted.
1.5 Research Contributions
The main research contribution of the thesis is a number of HTML steganography de-
tection mechanisms and algorithms directed at different categories of HTML steganog-
raphy. Figure 1.1 presents an overview of the identified HTML steganography detection
techniques. In the figure intermediate nodes (square cornered rectangles) represent the
identified HTML steganography categories and leaf nodes (round cornered rectangles)
represent the individual HTML steganography detection approaches proposed in this
thesis. In Attribute Permutation Steganography (APS) the embedding of hidden mes-
sages is performed through rearranging the attributes in HTML tags. For the attribute
permutation detection category two detection algorithms were proposed: (i) Statistical
Detection (SD) and (ii) Attribute Position Changes Count (APCC). For the Invisi-
ble characters Steganography (ICS) category, also known as open space steganography
(OSS), the hidden message is inserted using invisible characters such as white space
characters. In this case the frequency distributions of white space character segments
was considered and the Detect Invisible characters (DIC) algorithm was proposed. In
Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography (TLCSS) the embedding is performed by
switching the tag letters case from uppercase to lowercase and vice versa. In this case
the Tag Variance (TV) algorithm was proposed, an enhancement on a mechanism first
presented in [44]. A further contribution is that this set of detection methods has been
encoded and is available for download1.
For reference the following list summarizes the steganography detection algorithms
proposed in this thesis (the main contributions of the thesis). In each case the relevant
chapter number, where each contribution is discussed in further derail, is included in
parenthesis.
1. SD algorithm directed at APS (Chapter 3).
2. APCC algorithm also directed at APS (Chapter 4).
1https://sandbox.zenodo.org/record/167143
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Figure 1.1: Categorization of HTML steganography methods and the associated de-
tection approaches proposed in this thesis
3. The Detect Invisible characters (DIC) algorithm directed at ICS (Chapter 5).
4. The Tag Variance TV algorithm directed at TLCSS (Chapter 6).
As demonstrated later in the thesis, the proposed steganography detection approaches
outperformed all known HTML steganography detection approaches (from the litera-
ture) in most cases. Note also that the proposed steganography detection methods can
be used in combination to detect all three forms of identified HTML steganography.
1.6 Publications
Three peer reviewed publications have arisen out of the work presented in this thesis.
These are listed below together with a brief description of each.
1. Sedeeq Iman, Coenen Frans and Lisitsa Alexei (2016). “A Statistical
Approach to the Detection of HTML Attribute Permutation Steganog-
raphy”, In Proceedings of 2nd International Conference on Information
Security Systems and Privacy ( ICISSP 2016), SCITEPRESS-Science
and Technology Publications, pp. 522-527. This paper proposed the first
detection approach presented in this thesis, the SD approach directed at APS.
The idea presented was to consider the standard deviation of the position of tag
attributes in a webpage as an indicator of the presence (or otherwise) of steganog-
raphy. The paper suggested that by monitoring a webpage, standard deviation
values could be compared with a threshold value, and if they were over that thresh-
old HTML steganography was identified. The content of this paper is included in
Chapter 3.
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2. Iman Sedeeq, Frans Coenen and Alexei Lisitsa (2017). “Attribute Per-
mutation Steganography Detection using Attribute Position Changes
Count”, In Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Information
Security Systems and Privacy (ICISSP 2017), SCITEPRESS-Science
and Technology Publications, pp. 95-100, (winner of Best student pa-
per prize). This paper proposed the APCC algorithm, the second technique,
also directed at APS. The approach was found on the idea of an attribute position
changes count measure. This count was used to generate a feature vector web-
page training set that could be used to generate a classification model which could
then be used to distinguish between normal webpages and stego webpages. Three
classification models were considered: (i) Naive Beyes (NB), (ii) Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and (iii) MutiPerceptron Neural Network (MLP). The content of
this paper is covered in the context of Chapter 4.
3. Iman Sedeeq, Frans Coenen and Alexei Lisitsa (2017). “A Prediction
Model Based Approach to Open Space Steganography Detection in
HTML webpages”, Proceedings 16th International Workshop on Dig-
ital Forensics and Watermarking ( IWDW17), Springer International
Publishing IWDW 2017, LNCS 10431, pp. 235-247. This paper proposed
the Detect Invisible characters (DIC) algorithm; the third approach presented in
this thesis and directed at the detection ICS. The idea presented was to use the
frequency distributions of white space segments to define feature vectors similar
to those considered in the previous paper. A training set was developed in this
manner and classifiers were generated. The same three classification algorithms
were considered as in the previous paper: (i) Naive Beyes (NB), (ii) Support Vec-
tor Machine (SVM) and (iii) MutiPerceptron Neural Network (MLP). Previously
unseen webpages could then be classified as being either normal or stego webpages.
The content of this paper is covered in Chapter 5.
The TV approach presented in Chapter 6 is as yet unpublished.
1.7 Structure of Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2: Presents a review of the relevant literature, together with definitions
of the terminology used in the domain of streganography. The chapter also provides
a review of HTML steganography algorithms and current detection methods.
• Chapter 3: Provides a detailed review of the SD detection approach for APS
in the dynamic (monitoring) context. This is where the concept of Standard
Deviation of HTML attributes is introduced.
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• Chapter 4: Presents the APCC detection approach also directed at APS in the
static (non-monitoring) context. A range of classification model generators were
considered and evaluated and the results reported and discussed in the chapter.
Statistical significance analysis is also provided.
• Chapter 5: Considers the DIC detection approach. As in the case of the for-
going chapter evaluation was conducted using a number of classification models,
with/without feature selection; the results are reported on and discussed in the
chapter. Statistical significance analysis is again provided.
• Chapter 6: Presents the proposed TV algorithm to detect TLCSS. Note that
the TV algorithm is a more effective variation of the tag letter case switching
steganography detection algorithm presented in [44]. A comparison was thus con-
ducted; the outcomes of this comparison are reported on in the chapter. Statistical
significance analysis is also provided.
• Chapter 7: The concluding chapter of the thesis which presents a summary of
the research presented, the main research findings and some suggested directions
for the future work.

Chapter 2
Steganography Background and
Previous Work
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, Chapter 1, it was established that the work presented in this
thesis is directed at investigating and proposing a number of HTML steganography de-
tection methods. A review of the previous work related to the research presented in this
thesis is thus given in this chapter. The chapter commences, Section 2.2, with a review
of the historical evolution of steganography, since its foundation in the ancient era till
today. This section also includes a classification of modern digital steganography: (i)
Digital media steganography (ii) File system steganography and (iii) Network steganog-
raphy. The chapter then continues, in Section 2.3, with a more detailed look at modern
steganography and especially the terminology used. Section 2.4 then reviews the concept
of steganalysis, its potential goals, methodologies and types of steganlysis. This is then
followed by Section 2.5 which considers steganography in digital media (digital images
and text files). Section 2.6 then reviews steganalysis in digital media (digital images and
text files).
In some cases the HTML steganography detection techniques presented in this thesis
are founded on a data mining (machine learning) approach. The data mining process
is thus reviewed in Section 2.7 together with how a steganalysis model can be built for
classifying webpages as either normal webpages or stego webpages. In Section 2.8 a
comprehensive review of HTML steganography methods are presented (attribute per-
mutation, invisible characters and tag letters case switching) in more details. Section 2.9
presents a comprehensive overview of detection approaches that have been presented in
the literature directed at HTML steganography. The significance is that the operation
of the steganography detection approaches presented in this thesis was compared with
the operation of these approaches. The chapter then ends with a summary in Section
2.10.
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2.2 History of Steganography
In ancient Greek steganography literally means “covered writing”; the more modern
computer science interpretation is data concealed in other data. The usage of steganog-
raphy, as a method for secret communication, dates back to antiquity. The Greek
historian Herodotus (486-425 B.C.) reported examples of how steganography was used
in ancient times. Figure 2.1 shows how the usage of steganography has evolved with
time [100]. From the figure it can be seen that the earliest examples are those that
Herodotus reported on, such as: (i) shaving a slave’s hair and tattooing it with a mes-
sage which became hidden when the hair had regrown (ii) hiding letters in the soles of
shoes worn by “messengers” or in women’s earrings and (iii) sending notes by carrier
pigeons [31]. Arguably the most sophisticated method of that time was the practice of
carving a message on a wood tablet and then covering it by a thick layer of wax to avoid
arousing suspicion. The message could then be revealed simply by melting the wax [54].
As a result of humankind’s endless desire for communication secrecy, new opportuni-
ties for covert communication arose with the widespread availability of parchment (made
from animal matter) and the invention of invisible inks which become hidden upon dry-
ing. The message could be revealed using a heating process. Such inks were originally
made from organic matter but progresses in chemistry provided for more advanced inks
[17].
The invention of paper, by the Chinese, brought more opportunities for steganpgra-
phy. For example watermarking as an anti-counterfeiting and/or copyrighting technique
to distinguish manufactures’ products. Digital watermarking is now considered to be
a separate discipline within the domain of information hiding. Another consequence of
the invention of paper was the emergence and popularization of what is called linguistic
steganography where document text was arranged in such a way that a hidden message
was included. One example of linguistic steganography is where the first letter of each
line in a piece of writing is used to convey a message [52]. Geometric drawings have
also been used to hide messages. Examples also exist with respect to music scores where
each note represents a letter, or the number of occurrences of individual notes is used
as a letter indicator.
The European Enlightenment movement of the late 17th and 18th centuries and
the later industrial revolution facilitated further opportunities for steganography; of
particular note was the widespread readership of newspapers. Secret messages could be
embedded using space over or under letters and changing the height of letter strokes (a
further form of linguistic steganography).
In the 20th century the need for secrecy during periods of conflict (two World Wars)
necessitated further mechanisms for secret communication as a consequence of which
steganography began to truly flourish. That period witnessed the return to many forms
of invisible ink, and textual or linguistic steganography methods but more importantly
the usage of “spread spectrum” techniques in telecommunication and radio communica-
tion. In the case of the latter the spread of frequencies was used to embed information
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Figure 2.1: Steganography carrier evolution over time [100]
and scatter the signal so as to avoid detection. The advent of computer technology in
the 20th century lead to further innovation in steganography techniques.
Modern (digital) steganography can be classified as follows:
• Digital media steganography: This category is concerned with steganography
applied to digital media, such as: images, video, audio and text files. More details
will be given later on this category in Section2.5.
• File system steganography: File System Steganography is steganography di-
rected at the way that operating systems store files. For example using some
operating systems (such as Windows 95) if the “cluster” size is 32KB and the
size of a file is 1KB the remaining unused 31KB can be used to hide data [50].
Another form of file system steganography is by creating hidden partitions. These
partitions can then be used to hide files that only a person who knows the name
of the file and password can access [6, 72].
• Network steganography: This is the most recent form of modern digital steganog-
raphy whereby network protocols are utilized to convey secret communications.
Network protocols provide the two essential characteristics that a carrier of a hid-
den message should feature. Firstly these protocols are common and secondly they
permit alterations with no noticeable visual behavior. Moreover using communi-
cation channel delays, damaged packets and retransmission for some packets are
natural features that support hidden message passing without raising any alarm
[67, 75, 89].
The work presented in this thesis falls into the Digital Media Steganography category.
The remainder of the discussion presented in this chapter is therefore directed at this
form of Steganography.
2.3 Steganography In The Modern Context
This section presents an overview of steganography in terms of the modern context. A
steganography model is illustrated by “prisoners problem” proposed by Simmons and
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shown in Figure 2.2 [82]. In which two prisoners, Alice and Bob, are kept in separated
cells and wish to plan an escape, but are allowed to communicate via a (communication)
channel Wendy the warden using some carrier object and what is known as a stego key.
Alice and Bob therefore require a means of communication that will not draw Wendy’s
attention. In other words a form of steganography is required where Wendy is the
channel.
In her attempts to discover whether steganography is taking place Wendy is also
a steganalyst. Wendy could either be a “passive” or “active” steganalyser. Passive
steganalysis is concerned with only detecting the presence of a hidden message, whilst
active steganalysis is concerned not only with detecting the presence of steganography
but also with extracting the message content and either destroying it or replacing it with
something else.
The work presented in this thesis is concerned with passive steganalysis. The model
proposed by Simmons, as described, is the fundamental model on which the work pre-
sented in the rest of this thesis is based.
Figure 2.2: Steganography model [46]
The message which Alice wants to send is known also as the payload. Alice uses an
encoding method to hide the message in the carrier object. The possible carrier object
where a payload has already been hidden is a stego object. Alice will be considered the
steganographer. Finally Bob uses the stego-key and a decoding method to extract the
message. The usage of the stego-key in a steganography model can be thought of as
being analogous to the use of encryption keys in cryptography.
Kertchof’s principle [54], which holds that the secrecy of a hidden message lies on the
choice of the stego-key shared between the sender and receiver, is therefore applicable
in steganography. According to that there must be a prior steganography protocol that
both Alice and Bob agree with. Whatever the case, steganography protocols, can be
categorized according to whether a stego-key is used or not, and if so the nature of this
key, as follows [5, 19, 27, 54]:
• Pure steganography: steganography where no stego-key is used, in other words
nothing, apart from the embedding and extracting algorithms, is required to start
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communication. The security of the steganography system in this case depends
only on its secrecy. This is the case with respect to most modern steganography
techniques including HTML steganography.
• Secret key steganography: steganography where a secret stego-key (known
only to the sender and receiver) is used for embedding and extracting the hidden
message. In this case the steganography system is similar to a cipher text system.
• Public key steganography: steganography where two keys one public and the
other private are required. The public key is used to embed the hidden message
while the private key is used to reconstruct the hidden message.
2.4 Steganalysis
As noted in Chapter 1, the term steganalysis and the phrase steganography detection,
are both concerned with the process of detecting the presence of steganography in a
carrier. Steganalysis is analogous to cryptanalysis as applied in cryptography. The
main distinction between steganalysis and cryptanalysis is that the steganalysis process
starts with suspicion but uncertainty as to whether (say) a file has a hidden message,
whilst in cryptanalysis there is a prior evidence that a file contains an encrypted message.
Referring back again to Figure 2.2 Wendy the warden’s primary goal, as the steganalyist,
is to provide an answer to the question “Is a hidden message presenting or not in this
media?”.
The central theme of steganalysis is the observation that the process of replacing
redundancy in a carrier-object with an embedded message will change the statistical
properties of that carrier object. Steganography detection is conducted by analyzing
these statistical changes so as to uncover the presence of steganography [50].
When faced with a steganalysis task the attributes of the steganography algorithm
(embedding capacity, invisibility, undetectability and robustness) should be considered
first and weakness identified by the attacker.
The steganographer should also consider the nature of a potential attacker, human
or computer? A steganography method that operates by introducing grammatical errors
would be more susceptible to a human attacker than a computer attacker [11].
In this thesis steganography detection (steganalysis) for some cases is formulated
as a supervised learning problem. More specifically, given that the thesis is directed
at HTML steganography, where a labeled training set comprising a collection of stego
and non-stego pages is provided with which to train a binary classification model. The
labeled training set is used by a supervised learning algorithm to find a mapping function
between the attributes that feature in the webpages and the class attributes. This
mapping is then used to categorize previously unseen webpages as either stego or non-
stego webpages. What the relevant attributes are, is a part of the research, and will be
expanded upon later in the thesis.
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The remainder of this section comprises two subsections. Firstly Sub-section 2.4.1
considers the challenges of steganalysis in terms of both passive and active steganaly-
sis; particularly in the context of detecting HTML steganography. The huge number of
WWW pages that are available is the first, and most obvious, challenge for the stegan-
alyzer. Sub-section 2.4.2 then considers various categorizations of available steganalysis
methodologies and how the proposed HTML steganography detection approaches pre-
sented in this thesis fit into this categorization.
2.4.1 Challenges of Steganalysis
This subsection considers the challenges of steganalysis. The challenges encountered in
the context of passive steganalysis may be summarized as follows:
• In the case of HTML staganalysis scanning all webpages available over the Internet
is not a realistic proposition.
• Hidden data can be either place in sequential (specific) locations or scattered
throughout a carrier-object.
• Hidden data can be embedded in a chain over a number of carrier-objects.
• Steganalysis is a resource intensive and consequently time consuming.
The work presented in this thesis is broadly directed at all of these challenges, in the
context of HTML steganography, by proposing a number of computer automated ste-
ganalysis techniques.
2.4.2 Categorization of Steganalysis Methodologies
In the foregoing steganalysis was categorized as being either passive or active according
to whether the objective. In this section three alternative categorizations, taken form
the literature, are considered. The first of these is according to whether the steganalysis
methodologies of interest are targeted or universal as defined as follows [15]:
• Targeted or Specific Steganalysis: Steganalysis directed at the detection hid-
den messages that are embedded using a particular steganography technique.
When the steganography algorithm is known, the presence of hidden data can
be identified using knowledge of the way the information is embedded.
• Universal (blind): Steganalysis conducted where the nature of the steganogra-
phy algorithm is unknown. Thus these are general purpose stegnography detection
methods [35].
Clearly the steganography detection rate in the case of targeted steganalysis is much
higher than the detection rate using universal steganalysis methods because of the addi-
tional knowledge available of the targeted steganographic methods. The work presented
in this thesis is directed at targeted (passive) steganalysis.
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A second alternative steganalysis categorization found in the literature [11, 31, 53, 54]
is according to what knowledge the attacker has, such as: the nature of stego object,
original cover object, hidden message and the steganography algorithm.
Accordingly we can identify six types of attacks as listed in Table in 2.1. The table
lists the attack type in column 1 and in the following columns what, in each case, the
steganalyser (the attacker) is expected to know about the items (indicated by check
marks).
Table 2.1: Attack types according to what available to the attacker
Stego object Original cover object Hidden message Stego algorithm or tool
Stego only X
Known cover X X
Known message X X
Chosen stego X X
Chosen message X See below for detail concerning available knowledge
Known stego X X X
From the table it can be noted that “stego only” attack is the hardest while “known
stego” attack is the easiest. In case of “chosen message ” attack the attacker can generate
the stego objects using different hidden messages and different embedding algorithms.
This attack is used to recognize signatures that help the detection of other stego objects.
The final categorization considered in this subsection, and one of particular relevance
with respect to the work presented in this thesis, is that of steganalysis methods founded
on machine learning approaches and those that are not. Because of the relevance with
respect to the work presented in this thesis this categorization is considered in more
detail later in this chapter.
Thus in conclusion the steganalysis methodology adopted with respect to the stag-
analysis approaches presented in this thesis can be said to be passive, targeted, chosen
stego machine learning based methods.
2.5 Digital Media Steganography
As mentioned in Section 2.2 the category of digital media steganography will be pre-
sented in more details in this section. This category of steganography is applied to digital
media. The redundancy in these digital media types can easily be replaced by hidden
information. This category can also include watermarking although watermarking is
not strictly a steganography technique. Moreover these media types are popular on the
Internet so using them as a cover communication channel will not raise a suspicion.
The remainder of this section comprises two subsections. Firstly Sub-section 2.5.1
presents digital image steganography in particular because it is the most widespread
research area. Secondly Sub-section 2.5.2 presents steganography in text file, the signifi-
cance is that HTML steganography can be argued to be a special form of text steganog-
raphy.
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2.5.1 Digital Image Steganography
Digital images are the most popular multimedia type that attracted steganographers.
Some of reasons that motivated researchers to utilize digital images for steganography
are:
• The abundance of digital images on the Internet.
• Some of Human Visual System HVS attributes motivate researchers to exploit
these attributes in data hiding systems design.
• This media type provides enough redundancy to manipulate steganography.
Some of digital image steganography applications are: (i) Copyright (ii) Image integrity
(fraud detection) and (iii) Adding captions and (iiii) Fingerprinting (trailer-tracing). In
literature the common classification of image steganography methods [17, 20, 51, 63] is
based on the category of the domain that embedding process is taken place in as follows:
• Spatial domain steganography methods: in these methods, embedding hidden
messages in a cover image will occur in spatial domain. The Least Significant Bits
LSBs of image pixels are involved with encoding of a secret message [37, 62, 74, 98].
This category also includes applications for watermarking in binary document
images [14, 66].
• Frequency domain steganography methods: modification of LSBs in spatial
domain techniques did not succeed in resistance to attacks and deceiving human
visual system. To overcome aforementioned shortcoming, modification of LSBs in
frequency domain is adopted [47, 64, 76, 94, 97].
2.5.2 Steganography in Text Files
Text is one of the oldest choice of media for performing steganography. The abundance
of textual information on the Internet has encouraged steganographers to use this media
as a carrier for hidden messages.
There are many data hiding applications related to text files. In the context of copy-
right protection, as already noted, text watermarking might be used [4]. Steganography
can be used as well to add a “hash” to a text file to protect the file from tampering
[28]. The lack of redundancy in text files, compared to other forms of digital media
makes steganography using text files a challenge. There are many different kinds of text
steganography: a categorization of common text steganography methods is given in both
[11] and [21] where the following three broad categories are identified: (i) format based
methods that utilize existing text characteristics to hide data, (ii) random or statistical
generation methods where steganographers create their own text file, in which to hide
data, in such a way that it is statistically “natural” (frequencies of letters and words),
and (iii) linguistic methods that include syntactic and semantic methods.
In [58] the following alternative text steganography categorization is suggested:
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• Technical steganography: Methods that used technical processes to hide data
such as invisible ink.
• Linguistic steganography: Methods that hide data in non obvious ways. The
category can be subdivided into two sub-categories: (i) semagrams and (ii) open
codes. The semagrams sub-category includes text steganography methods whereby
data hiding is performed using the text itself, such as adding extra space characters,
line shifting, word shifting, deliberate misspelling and font resizing. The relevance
is that this is also applicable with respect to HTML stegnography. The open codes
sub-category is where data hiding is performed either using Jargon code, a language
understood by a select group and meaningless to others, or using covered ciphers
to hide data so that only someone who knows how the message was concealed can
recover it. The simplest method is null cipher method whereby (say) a prearranged
rule must be followed in order to embed and extract the hidden message. If the
rule is “read every first letter” then the set of first letters of each word, in an
innocuous piece of writing will represent the hidden message.
Another important branch of text steganography involves Natural Language Processing
(NLP) for the purpose of identifying synonym substitution [16], word abbreviation and
paraphrasing [28] as a means of conveying hidden messages. Also a text file can be
treated as an image and image steganography methods can be applied for watermarking
purposes as in [70, 99].
Figure 2.3 presents a total of 15 text steganographic tools, some of them are used
to embed secret messages in HTML files. Of these tools only wbStego and SNOW were
freely available to be used for evaluation of the proposed approach DIC for detecting
invisible characters steganography ICS, described in Chapter 5.
2.6 Steganalysis over Digital Media
In this section steganalysis over digital images and text files will be present. This is
as mentioned before that digital images are the most widespread research and HTML
steganography can be argued to be a special form of text steganography. The remainder
of this section comprises two subsections. Firstly Sub-section 2.6.1 presents steganalysis
over digital images. Secondly Sub-section 2.6.2 presents steganalysis over text files.
2.6.1 Steganalysis over Digital Images
As mentioned earlier that steganalysis aims to determine whether a testing object is a
clean object (has no hidden message) or a stego-object (has a hidden message). Accord-
ingly steganalysis can be considered as a two-class pattern classification problem. Also it
is mentioned in Sub-Section 2.4.2 that steganalysis is classified into targeted/specific and
universal/blind steganography. Some applications of these two categories in literature
are [63]:
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Figure 2.3: Text steganographic tools [42]
• For targeted/specific steganalysis: These methods take advantage of the insecure
aspect of a steganographic algorithm such as (i) Attacking LSB steganography in
spatial domain as in [34, 77, 93] (ii) Attacking LSB steganography in frequency
domain as in [36].
• For universal/blind steganalysis: These methods have less or even no such prior
information about steganography algorithm. These methods are based on two
stages training and testing. During the process, a feature extraction step is used.
The aim of the training stage is to obtain a trained classifier. Many models can
be used such as support vector machines SVM and neural network (NN), etc. In
literature many applications can be found depending on the features used (i) Image
Quality Feature [8] (ii) Calibration based feature [33] (iii) Moment based feature
[83] (iiii) Correlation based feature [88].
2.6.2 Steganalysis over Text files
In text files a tokenization process is required and the punctuation marks are removed to
get a stream of words as a preprocessing step for steganalysis. Some applications need a
dictionary preparation that includes all words of a collection. This dictionary might be
reduced to the words of high entropy which refer to the words that are important in a
given domain. Keywords that are identified the document content of a particular class
can be used as features. These keywords are the words that are repeated frequently in
the document [18, 101].
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2.7 Data Mining
As already established earlier in this categorization, the fundamental approach to steganog-
raphy analysis adopted in this thesis is one founded on data mining; a branch of machine
learning. Data mining can be defined as the extraction of interesting and useful infor-
mation by exploration and analysis of large quantities of data. It is an essential step of
the Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) process for extracting useful, but hidden,
knowledge from datasets of all kinds. Machine learning has been a computer science do-
main of research since the 1970s, data mining, as a domain of research, was established
more recently in the 1990s [2, 41].
The KDD process is traditionally considered to comprise the following steps:
1. Domain knowledge acquisition: In order to know how to utilize data mining
results a proper understanding is required of the problem domain. The domain of
interest with respect to this thesis is HTML steganography.
2. Data selection: In this step the data miner decides the nature of the data to be
used. In the context of the thesis the data of interest are HTML webpages, which
may or may not contain hidden messages.
3. Data preprocessing: This step typically comprises several tasks directed at
the identified data from Step 2, including: data cleaning, data pruning and data
transformation. The data preprocessing stage may also include data integration
and feature selection. Data integration is where the selected data has been collected
from more than one resource and consequently needs to be combined. Feature
selection is where a subset of the available features (attributes) are selected and
retained; the aim being to work with only the features “best” suited to producing
a good data mining result. Feature selection has a number of claimed advantages
[2, 12]; with respect to classification these may be itemized as follows:
• Reducing the dimentionality of the feature space, thus reducing storage re-
quirements and training time.
• Selecting the most relevant features for building the desired classification
model.
• Improving the classification model accuracy.
• Reducing overfitting.
In this thesis the proposed approach DIC for detecting invisible characters steganog-
raphy ICS, described in Chapter 5 used the wrapper feature selection method
(Appendix C ). This form of feature selection adopts a two stages approach: (i)
choosing the evaluation method by which the feature subsets are to be assessed
and (ii) choosing the search method by which the feature subset space is searched.
For proposed DIC approach the selected evaluation method was “CfsubsetEval”.
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For the search method a bestFirst search approach was adopted where the search
is conducted using a greedy hill-climbing search method with backtracking. This
search method either starts with an empty features set and searches forward, or
with full features set and searches backward.
4. Data Mining. This is the central element of the KDD process where the useful
knowledge hidden in the data is extracted. In the context of the thesis we are
interested in identifying patterns and relationships that can be used to determine
the presence of HTML steganography. There are a variety of data mining models
(descriptive and predictive) [48] that can be adopted depending on the desired
outcome.
5. Evaluation of patterns discovery: In this step an evaluation of the identified
patterns and/or relationships from step 4 is conducted. The aim is to gain con-
fidence in the discovered patterns and relationships. The evaluation mechanism
considered in the context of this thesis is discussed in Sub-section 2.7.2 below.
6. Discovered knowledge deployment: In this final step the discovered knowl-
edge is utilized. In the case of the thesis this is HTML steganography detection
(steganalysis).
The work presented in this thesis falls into the predictive, supervised, learning cate-
gory where a pre-labeled training set to build a predictor is used. More specifically the
work is directed at building binary classifiers that can be used to “predict” whether a
given webpage features steganography or not. The process of building, evaluating and
using a classifier is therefore discussed in further detail in the following Sub-sections.
2.7.1 Classification
A classification problem is where we wish to identify the membership of an object with
respect to a given set of categories called classes. If we have only two classes we have a
binary classification problem. Thus the classification problem can be formulated in the
form of a tuple 〈X,Y 〉, where X is a set of attributes and Y is a set of classes (also known
as the target attributes). While the attribute set might be discrete and/or continuous
the classes must be discrete. Regression can be used where the classes are not discrete.
Classification has many diverse applications, examples include: the classification
of human tissue cells as being malignant or benign and the classification of galaxies
according to their type. Classification operates by first generating a classifier. In the
case of supervised classification this is done using a pre-labeled training set. The nature
of the training set is therefore important. Evaluation of the classifier is conducted using
a pre-labeled test set; the training and test set should not be the same.
There are many algorithms available that can be employed to build the desired
classifier. In this thesis the following are used: (i) Naive Bayes (NB) (ii) Support Vector
Machines SVM and (iii) Neural Network (NN) in WEKA machine learning software.
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These were selected because they are among the most commonly used in the literature
and because they operate in very different ways.
2.7.2 Classifier Evaluation
In order to evaluate the outcome of a binary classifier (a two classes problem) there are
a number of performance measures that can be adopted. The majority can be generated
using what is known as a confusion matrix of the form shown in Figure 2.4. A confusion
matrix is a table that compares class values predicted by a classifier and true observed
values. Using the counts True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP)
and False Negative (FN) held in the confusion matrix we can determine a variety of
classifier performance measurements. The most frequently used are:
  Bench Mark  
  X Not X  
Classifier 
X 
(Positive) 
True Positives (TP), 
records of class X that 
were correctly classified 
as X 
False Positives (FP), 
records of class Not X 
that were incorrectly 
classified as X 
Total Positive 
classifications 
Not X 
(Negative) 
False Negatives (FN), 
records of class X that 
were incorrectly 
classified as class Not X 
True Negatives 
(TN), records of class 
Not X that were 
correctly classified as 
class Not X 
Total Negative 
classifications 
  
Total number of records 
belonging to class X 
Total number of 
records belonging to 
class Not X 
Total number of 
records 
 
Figure 2.4: Confusion matrix for a binary classifier
• Accuracy: The number of correct predictions divided by the total number of
predictions. It is an overall measure of a classifiers performance. The higher the
accuracy the better. Accuracy, using a confusion matrix, is calculated as follows:
Accuracy(Acc) =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
(2.1)
• Sensitivity: Also known as recall or the true positive rate (TPR) of the positive
class label (class X in Figure 2.4), is calculated as follows:
Sensitivity(Sens) =
TP
TP + FN
(2.2)
• Specificity: Also known as the false positive rate of the negative class label (class
not X in Figure 2.4), is calculated:
Specificity(Spc) =
FP
FP + TN
(2.3)
• Area Under Curve (AUC): AUC is a combination of sensitivity and specificity
in one single metric. Different thresholds ({0.0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . }) are used to calcu-
late and plot sensitivity and specificity on a graph with specificity along the X-axis
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and sensitivity along the Y-axis. The resulting curve is known as a ROC curve.
AUC is then the area under the ROC curve as shown in Figure 2.5. The closer
the ROC curve is to the northwest corner (in the figure) the higher the AUC. A
classifier with an AUC of 1.0 will be a perfect classifier.
Figure 2.5: ROC example with AUC = 0.79 [24]
2.8 Methods of HTML Steganography
The work presented in this thesis is directed at three forms of HTML steganography:
1. Attribute Permutation Steganography (APS) [45, 80, 81].
2. Invisible characters Steganography (ICS) [60, 91].
3. Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography (TLCSS) [87, 96].
In each case a variety of methods are available to allow their implementation. Those
used with respect to the work presented in this thesis are discussed in the following three
subsections, Subsections 2.8.1 to 2.8.3.
2.8.1 Attribute Permutation Steganography APS
Attribute Permutation Steganography (APS) uses the fact that HTML is insensitive to
how tag attributes are ordered. Thus in the following example the HTML “img” tag
has four attributes: src, alt, width and height.
<img src=“w3schools.jpg” alt=“W3Schools.com” width=“104” height=“142”>
Thus there are 24 (4× 3× 2× 1) different ways in which the attributes can be ordered,
enough to encode the most common letters in the English alphabet. The browser however
will render all the images in the same way regardless of the attribute ordering. Also
the rearranging of the attribute ordering will not cause any change to the overall size of
the HTML file, it will be the same regardless of the attribute ordering. Three different
APS mechanisms for implementing APS are considered in this thesis: (i) Deogol [80],
(ii) Huang et al. [45] and (iii) Shen et al. [81]. These were selected because they are
referenced in the literature. Each is discussed in further detail below. With respect to
the discussion the following definitions should first be noted:
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• H: An (HTML encoded) webpage.
• M : A text message to be hidden in H.
• N : A single (large) number made of the ASCII codes representing M .
• T : A tag with its set of attributes in H such that T = {a1, a2, a3, . . . am}, where
m is the number of the attributes in it (|T | = m).
• Q: A set of tags in H such that |T | ≥ 2.
The mechanisms of Deogol and Huang et al. are approximately the same, the only
difference is in how the attribute permutation is conducted. Algorithm 1 shows the
pseudo code for the APS method of Deogol and Huang et al. The input to the algorithm
is a webpage H and a message M to be embedded in the webpage. The output is a stego
webpage H ′. In Huang et al. step 10 is performed using a lexical ordering method (A-Z)
to generate the permutations. In the case of Deogol the specifics of the permutation
generation were not given and thus, in the context of the thesis, reverse lexical ordering
was used (Z-A).
Algorithm 1: Attribute Permutation Steganography [45, 80]
1: Input a webpage H
2: Input a message M
3: Output= a stego webpage H ′
4: N=large number made of the ASCII codes representing M.
5: M=N
6: Find Q set
7: while M 6= 0 do
8: for each tag T ∈ Q do
9: M ′=M div m! (m is the number of T attributes)
10: p=M mod m! (p is a number between 0 and m!-1)
11: Transform p to a permutation
12: Replace T with the new permutation
13: M=M ′
14: end for
15: end while
The mechanism of Shen et al. [81] used an alternative approach to APS to that
utilized in Deogol. and Huang et al. Using the approach of Shen et al. a binary
relation between the tag attributes is translated to a binary string. Before describing
the approach in further detail the following definitions should be noted, in addition to
the previously presented definitions:
• SubMessage: A function used to find a sub-message sm in M such that the length
of |sm| = |T | − 1.
• BinaryString: A function to transform |T | − 1 attributes into a binary string BS.
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• G: A set of BS permutations.
• Trunc: a function that “cuts” sm from M .
The pseudo code for the APS method proposed of Shen et al. is given in Algorithm 2.
As before the input to the algorithm is a webpage H and a message M to be embedded
in H. The output is a stego webpage H ′. The algorithm operates by first fetching sm
and generating BS to represent the relationship between tag attributes (line 8). Note
that BS is generated using a dictionary ordering of the attributes first letters such that
if the first letter of attribute a1 is alphabetically before the first letter of attribute a2
or they are the same then the bit in BS is 0, otherwise the bit is 1. In line 9 the set
G, that includes all the permutations of BS, is generated. Any permutation in G that
equals sm will be used to replace T .
All three APS methods were used with respect to the work presented in this thesis.
Although not included in Algorithms 1 and 2 a check for the Maximum Embedding
Capacity (MEC) of a webpage is required before embedding can take place. The MEC
is the maximum hidden message length, in bits or bytes (assuming a one byte character
encoding), that a webpage H can carry. This is an essential step to test that the webpage
H can be a container for the hidden message or not. For Algorithm 1 the MEC, MEC1,
can be calculated using Equation 2.4; whilst for Algorithm 2 the MEC, MEC2, can be
calculated using Equation 2.5. Note that the MEC values resulting from equations 1
and 2 are in bytes. According to Equation 2.4 and 2.5 MEC provided by approaches of
Deogol and Huang et al. is greater than MEC provided by the approach of Shen et al.
Algorithm 2: Attribute Permutation Steganography [81]
1: Input a webpage H
2: Input a message M
3: Output= a stego webpage H ′
4: Find Q set
5: while M 6= 0 do
6: for each tag T ∈ Q do
7: sm=SubMessage(m, |T | − 1)
8: BinaryString=transform |T | − 1 attributes to a binary string BS
9: Find G a set of BS permutations
10: p=permutation in G that equals to sm
11: Replace T with p.
12: M=Trunc(M,sm)
13: end for
14: end while
MEC1(H) =
1
8
blog2
∏
Tj∈Q
(|Tj |!)c (2.4)
MEC2(H) =
1
8
∑
Tj∈Q
(|Tj | − 1) (2.5)
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2.8.2 Invisible Characters Steganography ICS
When a web browser renders an HTML webpage it does not pay attention to invisible
characters such as: white space (ASCII 0x20) and tab (ASCII 0x19) characters. The
Invisible Characters Steganography (ICS) approach makes use of this feature to hide
messages in HTML files with no visual alteration in the rendered webpage. This kind
of steganography is known also as Open Space Steganography (OSS). The idea was first
proposed in the mid-1990s [10]. Although embedding white space characters in a text file
will increase the file size, these methods offer the advantage that in any document white
space characters will appear frequently, more than any other character, therefore the
existence of additional white space characters is unlikely to cause suspicion. In addition,
and subject to how the ICS is applied and how the cover text file is viewed, in many
cases the inclusion of additional white space characters will not result in any noticeable
change in the look of the file from the viewer’s perspective. Even where additional
white space characters are visible, an observer is unlikely to pay significant attention to
their presence and is unlikely to consider these spaces to represent a hidden message.
ICS uses one or more of the following i.e to hide messages: (i) inter-word spacing i.e
spacing between two successive words; (ii) inter-sentence spacing i.e spacing between two
successive sentences, (iii) additional spaces at the end of lines; and (iv) inter-paragraph
spacing, spacing between two consecutive paragraphs. An example of using white space
characters to hide a message is shown in the following:
<tag>, </tag> sending “0”
<tag >, </tag > sending “1”
In this example when tags are written without inserting a space character this sends
a 0, while inserting a space character sends a 1 (assuming that the messages to be hidden
is in binary form).
As in the case of APS there are many tools available for ICS. Examples include:
SNOW [60], Spacemimic [73], wbStego4open [91] and WhiteSteg [69]. The two se-
lected for use with respect to the work presented in the thesis were SNOW and wb-
Stego4open; these were selected because they are freely available, frequently referenced
in the steganography literature and because of their ease of use.
Using SNOW the message is embedded using white space characters at the end of
lines. When the host file is too short to accommodate the message SNOW embeds the
remaining message at the end of the host file. Before hiding, each character in the
message is encoded and written as a triplet (3 bits at a time) by introducing 0 to 7
spaces, the tab character is used as a delimiter for these triplets.
Using the wbStego4open steganography tool, white space characters are inserted
between words and sentences. Using wbStego4open a space character is used to em-
bed a 1 and a tab character to embed a 0. Unlike SNOW, before hiding the message
wbStego4open checks if the cover file is large enough to accommodate the message.
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2.8.3 Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography TLCSS
As mentioned before that HTML tags and attributes are case insensitive. This feature is
used in Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography (TLCSS) to hide messages in HTML
files. An example is given in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: HTML steganography using tag letters case switching [25]
Both algorithms of Sui and Luo in [87] and Shen Y.[96] present approaches for
conducting TLCSS. The following definitions should be noted before the pseudo code
for the aforementioned steganography approaches are given:
• H: An (HTML encoded) webpage.
• M : A binary encoded text message to be hidden in H. M = {m1,m2,m3, . . .mn}.
• Q: A set of tag names in H.
The pseudo code for the method adopted in Sui and Luo [87] is shown in Algorithm
3. The input to the algorithm is a webpage H and a message M to be hidden, the
output is a stego webpage H ′. In the algorithm, if a message bit mi is equal to 1 then
the tag letter is switched to uppercase otherwise nothing is done. All tag letters are
utilized to hide the message. The approach presented in Shen Y. [96] is very similar to
that presented in Algorithm 3 except that only the first letter of each tag is used.
Again, although not included in Algorithm 3 a Maximum Embedding Capacity
(MEC) check is required before embedding can take place. For the approach of Sui
and Luo in Algorithm 3 this can be calculated using Equation 2.6, while for the ap-
proach of Shen Y.[96] it can be calculated using Equation 2.7. Note that the MEC
values resulting from equations 2.6 and 2.7 are in bytes. It should also be noted that Q
is a set that contains the tags that are included in the given webpage H, and that |Tj |
here refers to the number of English alphabet letters in tag Tj .
MEC1(H) =
1
8
∑
Tj∈Q
|Tj | (2.6)
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Algorithm 3: Tag letters case switching of Sui and Luo
1: Input a webpage H
2: Input a message M
3: Output= a stego webpage H ′
4: Find Q set
5: while M 6= 0 do
6: for each tag T ∈ Q do
7: if mi = 1 then
8: Switch a tag letter to uppercase
9: else
10: No switching
11: end if
12: M = M −mi
13: end for
14: end while
MEC2(H) =
1
8
∗ |Q| (2.7)
Unlike in the case of ICS, and like APS, the usage of TLCSS will not cause any
HTML file size to increase. However, the irregular use of upper and lower case used in
the tags can be readily detected from the raw HTML source code and therefore arouse
suspicion.
2.9 HTML Steganography Detection
HTML steganograohy detection approaches can be categorized according to whether
they are used in a dynamic (monitoring) context or a static (non-monitoring) context.
The two scenarios were briefly reviewed in Chapter 1. An alternative, and compatible,
categorization is according to the nature of the HTML steganography. As noted in the
previous section three types of HTML steganography are considered in this thesis: (i)
Attribute Permutation Steganography (APS), (ii) Invisible characters Steganography
(ICS) and Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography (TLCSS). In this penultimate
section of the literature review chapter the previous work on HTML steganography
detection is reviewed. The section is divided into three subsections corresponding to the
three types of HTML steganography considered in this thesis.
2.9.1 Attribute Permutation HTML Steganography Detection
In the literature there are two notable APS detection techniques that have been pro-
posed, that of L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65] and that of W.Jian-feng et al. [95]. Both
are considered here, and both techniques are considered for the purpose of evaluating
the APS detection techniques proposed later in this thesis in Chapters 3 and 4.
The work presented of L.Polak and Z. Kotulski falls into the static APS detection
category and is based on the idea of identifying a predominant attribute pair ordering.
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For each pair of attributes the detection algorithm counts how many times the first
attribute appears before the second and vice-versa; the assumption is that a non-stego
webpage will have a more consistent ordering than in the case of a stego-webpage.
The ordering distribution is encapsulated using a value of W . More formally, given
a set of m webpage tags T = {t1, t2, t3, . . . tm} and the knowledge that each tag ti
has ki occurrences. Each tag occurrence ti,j has a set of attributes associated with it
Ai,j = {a1, a2, . . . } where i is the tag identifier and j is the occurrence number of the
tag (j ≤ k). If tag ti has a pair of attributes ax and ay ordered in such a way that ax
proceeds ay in most instances of ti then the value Rij(ax, ay) = 1 otherwise the R value
is 0. If it so happens that the distribution of both attribute pairs ax, ay and ay, ax is
equal, Rij(ax, ay) = 1 as well. The W value is then calculated using Equation 2.8 which
calculates the fraction of the ax and ay attribute pairs that occurs in different orderings
from the total number of pairings C.
∀x∀y x < y : W = 1−
∑m
n=1
∑k
i=1Rn,i(ax, ay)
C
(2.8)
When the value of W is high this indicates that the attribute pair ay and ax occurred
more often than the attributes pair ax and ay which is different from the predominant
order. This denotes a changing of webpage structure. Thus W can be used as an
indicator of APS given some threshold value.
The work presented of W.Jian-feng et al. in [95] falls into the dynamic APS detection
category. This work, as in the case of some of the work presented later in this thesis,
also falls into the supervised learning category. Similarly the work presented in [95]
is based on the idea of learning a classification model that can be used to predict the
presence or absence of APS. SVM classification was adopted, although any other form of
classification model generator could equally well have been used. Feature vectors were
generated using two statistics: (i) the distance between the attribute mean position
benchmark and the sample attribute mean position of the suspicious webpage and (ii)
the variance of attribute positions. In [95] three parameters were used with respect
to the selected attributes: (i) the number of attributes to be considered (BA), (ii) the
number of attribute appearances in terms of mean distance (TD) and (iii) the number of
attribute appearance in terms of variance (TV). The following parameter settings were
recommended in [95]: (i) BA = 3, (ii) TD = 3 and (iii) TV = 3.
The approaches of both L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65] and W.Jian-feng et al. were
used for evaluation purposes with respect to the work presented later in this thesis in
Chapters 3 and 4.
2.9.2 Invisible Characters HTML Steganography Detection
As in the case of APS detection, there are a variety of mechanisms that have been
proposed in the literature for the purpose of ICS. Two mechanisms found in literature
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of Sui and Luo[68] and Huang et al. [43]; both are directed at static detection since they
used a single webpage snapshot to determine if steganography exists.
The idea presented by Sui and Luo in [68] is based on the usage of a probabilis-
tic model to detect whether additional invisible characters have been inserted into an
HTML file or not. Two occurrence probability values were used for this purpose: (i) the
probability of a white space character occurring (ptsco) and (ii) the probability of white
space character sequence occurrence (pscso). The first is calculated using Equation 2.9
where W is a webpage, while the second is calculated using Equation 2.10.
ptsco(W ) =
Nws
Nallchar
(2.9)
pscso(W ) =
Nwss
Nws
(2.10)
where:
• Nws: Is the number of white space characters in a webpage W .
• Nallchar: Is the number of all characters in a webpage W .
• Nwss: Is the number of space character sequences in a webpage W .
These probabilities were compared with predetermined thresholds to decide whether
a given webpage was a normal webpage or a stego-webpage. The thresholds in this case
were identified using Zipf’s and Heaps’ law, and a Finite-State Model [78]. The authors
estimated that the probability of occurrence of a white space character (ptsco) in a text
file was approximately 0.2 ± 0.1 (varying range), a threshold of 0.3 was thus proposed.
The authors also estimated that the total white space character sequence occurrence
probability (pscso), in a text file, was 0.2.
The work presented by Huang et al. in [43] was founded on the concept of “embedding
rate” (erate). This is the ratio between the length of a hidden message M and the size
of a given WWW page (Wallchar). M = size of a given webpage (Wallchar) - size of a
given webpage with invisible characters removed (Wwithout). Embedding rate of a given
webpage (erate(W )) can be calculated using Equation 2.11. The authors defined the
normal distribution of the embedding rate using the mean (µ) and standard deviation
(δ) of the erate distribution to define a threshold with which to distinguish normal
webpages from stego-webpages.
erate(W ) =
M
Wallchar
(2.11)
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The approaches proposed by Sui and Luo [68] and Huang et al. [43] were both
utilized for evaluation purposes with respect to the proposed ICS technique presented
later in this thesis (see Chapter 5).
2.9.3 Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography Detection
In the case of TLCSS the work of Huang et al.[44] is another static detection approach
found in literature considered in this thesis. The idea presented by Huang et al. is based
on the idea presented in [35] where image steganography is considered. More specifically
the idea of considering the Least Significant Bits LSBs in grayscale images to detect
the presence of hidden messages. The fundamental approach to TLCSS detection in
[44] is founded on the observation that switching the tag letters case will break the
inherent “smoothness” of the tag content. Tag letters will be a mixture of lowercase
letters (the set c = {26 lowercase ASCII characters}) and uppercase letters (the set
C = {26 uppercase ASCII characters}). The detection approach of Huang et al. used
the Tag Offset concept. This is the absolute value of the summation of the distance
between two adjacent letters in a tag. This Tag Offset is computed using the following
function F :
F (T (x1, x2, ...., xn)) =
n−1∑
i=1
|A(xi+1)−A(xi)|, (2.12)
Where T (x1, x2, ....xn) is an HTML tag. A(xi) ∈ (c′ ∪ C ′) such that:
set c′ = {lowercase ASCII codes} and set C ′ = {uppercase ASCII codes}. Hiding data
by switching tag letters will increase the Tag Offset, in other words the discrimination
F value (from Equation 2.12) will increase.
Switching tag letters can be performed using the following two flipping functions and
the mask M :
• Positive flipping f+1 :
– f+1(x) switches the lowercase→ uppercase.
• Negative flipping f−1 :
– f−1(x) switches the uppercase → lowercase.
Where M is a vector of length n comprised of the values +1, −1 and 0. There will
be M+ mask for positive flipping and M− mask for negative flipping. Note that for
TLCSS detection the locations of 1 and −1 values in both the M+ and M− masks are
the same. A third function f0(x) maintains the letter case as it is.
Applying these flipping functions to all letters in T (x1, x2, ...., xn) using a mask M
results in an altered tag T ′M (x1, x2, ...., xn) such that:
T ′M (x1, x2....xn) = T (fM(1)(x1), fM(2)(x2), . . . fM(n)(xn)) (2.13)
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The offset of T ′M (x1, x2, ....xn) is computed using the function F in Equation 2.12.
Accordingly the tags in a webpage are partitioned into three sets of tags Regular (R),
Singular (S), Unchanged (U); these sets are referred to as the RS statistics in the work
of Fridrich et.al [35] such that :
R = {T (x1, x2, ...., xn)|F (T ′M (x1, x2, ...., xn)) > F (T (x1, x2, ...., xn))}
S = {T (x1, x2, ...., xn)|F (T ′M (x1, x2, ...., xn)) < F (T (x1, x2, ...., xn))}
U = {T (x1, x2, ...., xn)|F (T ′M (x1, x2, ...., xn)) = F (T (x1, x2, ...., xn))}
According to the above, when applying positive flipping, the statistics are RM+ and
SM+ using mask M+ = [+1, 0]; and RM−, and SM− when applying negative flipping
using mask M− = [−1, 0].
An alternative discrimination function is proposed in this thesis in Chapter 6 as an
alternative to the Tag Offset function. A comparison of the TLCSS detection approach
presented by Huang et al. and that proposed in this thesis is presented in Chapter 6.
2.10 Summary
This chapter has provided the reader with a review of the existing work that underpins
the work presented in the thesis. The chapter commenced with a review of the history
of steganography from ancient times to the modern day. Definitions for the terminology
used in steganography were then presented, together with discussion of both the chal-
lenges of steganalysis and the methodologies that may be adopted. The central theme of
the work presented in this thesis is to address steganalysis using data mining approaches.
Data mining is a central step in the Knowledge Discovery in Data (KDD) process, this
process was thus also reviewed. There are a variety of data mining techniques that fall
within the domain of KDD, the technique adopted in this thesis was classification. An
overview of classification and the process of evaluating the performance of classification
models was thus included in the review. The chapter then went on to consider the nature
of HTML steganography, the type of steganography which the work presented in this
thesis is directed; especially the HTML steganalysis methods that have been proposed
in the literature. The significance of the later was that some of these mechanisms were
used for evaluation purposes with respect to the steganalysis methods proposed later in
the thesis. The next chapter describes the proposed SD detection approach for APS in
the monitoring context.

Chapter 3
HTML Attribute Position
Standard Deviation for APS
Detection
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the Statistical Detection (SD) proposed approach for detecting
Attribute Permutation Steganography (APS). Recall that the fundamental idea of APS,
as presented in Chapter 2, is the utilization of the HTML feature of insensitivity to tag
attribute ordering to hide messages. For example the two following tags are interpreted
identically by an HTML browser, without noticeable alteration in the rendered webpage:
<img src=“w3schools.jpg” alt=“W3Schools.com” > sending “0”
<img alt=“W3Schools.com” src=“w3schools.jpg” > sending “1”
Both of the above express the same information but the different attributes ordering
can be used to send a hidden message. Note also that any reordering does not result in
any increase in the HTML file size after hidden message embedding has taken place. This
makes it difficult to identify the possible presence of any steganography by inspection
of the HTML source code alone.
As also noted in Chapter 2, the APS algorithms used with respect to this thesis
were: (i) Huang et. al [45], (ii) Deogol [80] and (iii) Shen et. al [81]. The nature of
APS is governed by the number of tags, in a given carrier WWW page, with two or
more attributes. The fundamental idea underpinning the proposed SD APS detection
approach is to monitor the position changes of a webpage attributes in terms of the
position standard deviations (St.Ds) and to use these to identify the presence of a hidden
message or otherwise use some specified threshold. The utilization of this concept for
steganography detection entails two significant challenges:
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• The St.D computed for different HTML encoded webpages, without any embedded
messages, may vary significantly; hence it will be difficult to establish a global APS
detection threshold.
• In the case of dynamic webpages the St.D computed at time t1 may not be the
same as time t2.
Some experimental results evidencing the above are given in Section 3.3.
As noted in Chapter 2, previous work on APS detection can be found in L.Polak and
Z. Kotulski [65] and W.Jiang-feng et al. [95]. The first addressed APS in the dynamic
(monitoring) context, whilst the second considered the static (non-monitoring) context.
Recall also that in L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65] a threshold W was used to describe the
ratio of HTML attribute pairs that occurs in different orderings to the total number of
HTML attribute pairings. It is suggested that W should be a constant when considering
webpages where the hidden message is transmitted continuously and a variable if the
hidden message is transmitted only over an appointed period of time, however, no specific
values for W were suggested. Similarly, the most suitable parameter settings for: (i)
total training time T , (ii) the interval between webpage snapshot captures τ and (iii) the
nature of an embedded message L, were not provided. Consequently, in the evaluation
reported on in this chapter the parameters used were those selected by the author.
Regarding the work presented by W.Jiang-feng et al. [95] this was directed at the
static (non-monitoring) context. In this work the following settengs were used: (i) a
feature vector representation was used as input to a SVM classifier model and that two
features were considered, distance between the attribute benchmark mean position to the
mean of the same attribute of the suspicious webpage and the variance of the attribute
positions; (ii) the detection rate of the reported experimental results varied between
72.4% and 84.6% and (iii) the length L, or the nature (natural English language text or
random text) of the hidden message was not considered in the reported evaluation.
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 presents the
results of an investigation into the effect of APS on the attribute position statistics in
a webpage. Section 3.3 introduces the webpage SD concept. Section 3.4 then presents
the SD monitoring process. Section 3.5 presents the evaluation of the SD concept and
finally Section 3.6 presents a summary of the chapter and the main findings.
3.2 Attribute Positions Modification Resulting From APS
The process of using the standard deviation of attribute positions with respect to the
mean position in HTML files is founded on the observation that, generally speaking,
without any hidden message embedding, any given attribute tends to be located in the
same position in most of the tags. By reordering tag attributes to hide a message, the
coherency of the attribute positions changes.
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An example is presented in Table 3.1 using the rel 1 and the src 2 tag attributes.
The table lists the attribute positions before and after embedding an English language
message using Shen APS algorithm. From the table it can be seen that the attribute
position number changes as a result of message hiding. In the table the rel attribute
appears ten times at position “0” until message hiding takes place when the position
fluctuates between position “0” and position “1”. In the case of the case of the src
attribute the attribute appears 11 times, usually at position “3” and sometimes at other
positions before embedding. Again positions are changed after message hiding has taken
place.
Table 3.1: Attribute positions before and after embedding process
attribute positions attribute positions
attribute before embedding after embedding
rel 0000000000 0001010111
src 33333332001 32322312103
As shown in Table 3.1 the dispersion of attribute positions will increase if message
hiding is taking place, in other words the variance of attribute positions will increase and
consequently the standard deviation will increases as well. This in turn can be used as
an indicator of the presence of APS (as described in Chapter 2). Recall that in statistics
Standard Deviation is a measure used to quantify the dispersion of a set of data values
with respect to their mean. A low St.D value indicates that the distribution of the data
values is close to the mean, while a high St.D value indicates that the distribution of
the data values is much more spread. For any dataset S a standard deviation can be
calculated using the following equation:
St.D =
√∑n
i=1 (xi − µ)2
n
(3.1)
Where xi is a data value in set S, n is the number of data values in S and µ is the mean
of the data values in S.
3.3 Standard Deviation of an HTML File Calculation
After presenting the effect of APS on the distribution of attribute locations within HTML
tags in the previous section, the conjecture was that this can be usefully employed to
distinguish a stego webpage from a clean webpage. The main idea was to identify the
presence of APS by monitoring the St.D of attribute positions within webpages.
Before presenting the proposed APS detection algorithm the following definitions
should be noted:
1The rel is used with the a HTML tag to indicate the relationship between the current document
and the linked resource.
2The src is used with the img HTML tag to specify the URL of the image.
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• H: An input webpage.
• S: A set of tags T in H that have two attributes or more, S = {T1, T2, . . . }.
• Tj = {a1, a2, . . . , an} denotes the jth tag in S with its attributes.
• attPositions(ai): The array of positions in S for attribute ai, attPositions(ai) =
[p1, p2, . . . pm]. Each attribute has m occurrences such that: length(attPositions(ai))=m.
• VattPositions(ai) is the variance of attribute ai positions in attPositions(ai) array
and is calculated as follows:
V attPositions(ai) =
∑m
k=1 (pk − av)2
m
(3.2)
av =
∑m
k=1 pk
m
(3.3)
• V S is the total variance of attributes positions for all tags in S. The total variance
is equal to the summation of their variances as shown in equation 3.4 below:
V S =
n∑
i=1
V attPositions(ai) (3.4)
Where n is the total number of all tags attributes in S.
• St.D is the standard deviation of V S used to quantify the amount of variation in
webpage attribute positions, and is calculated using:
St.D =
√
V S (3.5)
The process for calculating the St.D of a webpage attributes locations is given in
Algorithm 4. The input to the algorithm is a webpage H, whilst the output is the
St.D of the attributes positions in the set of tags S. The algorithm commences by first
finding S, the set of tags with two or more attributes in the given webpage. The attribute
positions are collected in the the array attPositions(ai) using collectPositions(ai function.
The total variance of attributes positions, V S, is the calculated using the sequence of
an attribute positions in VattPositions(ai) for all attributes one by one. Finally the
associated value for St.D is obtained.
Table 3.2 gives the St.D values, computed using algorithm 4, for 10 webpages of
Monitoring dataset in Appendix A. This St.D values were computed before any embed-
ding of messages had taken place. From the table it can be seen that the calculated
St.D values vary significantly between the selected webpages illustrating the challenge
of identifying a suitable threshold for the purpose of detecting APS.
Chapter 3. HTML Attribute Position Standard Deviation 39
Algorithm 4: Standard Deviation (St.D) calculation of a webpage attributes’
positions
1: Input: H
2: Output: St.D standard deviation of H
3: Find S The set of tags T with two attributes or more
4: VS=0
5: for each tag T ∈ S do
6: i=1
7: for each attribute ai ∈ T do
8: if notSeenBefore(ai) then
9: attPositions(ai)=collectPositions(ai)
10: m= length(attPositions(ai))
11: for each position p in attPositions(ai) do
12: av =
∑m
j=1 (pj)
m
13: V attPositions(ai) =
∑m
j=1 (pj−av)2
m
14: end for
15: V S = V S + V attPositions(ai)
16: i=i+1
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: St.D =
√
V S
Table 3.2: Standard Deviation (St.D) values calculated for 10 webpages of Monitoring
dataset
A webpage St.D before embedding
www.bbc.co.uk 3.01
www.nytimes.com 6.12
www.wikipedia.org 2.91
www.stackoverflow.com 2.41
www.sony.com 4.19
www.liverpool.ac.uk 4.43
www.ieee.org 5.84
www.webmd.com 4.83
www.microsoft.com 4.94
www.amazon.com 6.77
3.4 APS Monitoring Process
Using the above approach we can determine the attribute position St.D value for a
given WWW webpage H. By monitoring the St.D over a period of time the conjecture
is that we can identify attribute permutation steganography APS whenever unusual
St.D values are detected. This requires the establishment of a webpage steganography
detection threshold σ. The idea here is that the value for σ can be learnt by deliberately
seeding a training sequence of “snapshots” C = {s1, s2, . . . ,n } ofH with hidden messages
(using APS). In other words the monitoring commences with a “training process” during
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which the value for σ is learnt. More specifically snapshots of the webpage of interest are
collected periodically at intervals of time τ over a period of time T . For each snapshot
a message of length L is generated L ≤ MEC(H) (recall that MEC is a Maximum
Embedding Capacity as defined in Chapter 2 and the St.D before and after message
embedding is calculated. The value for σ is then calculated using the following equation:
σ = (α× St.Davbefore) + ((1− α)× St.Davafter) (3.6)
Where: (i) α is a user specified sensitivity factor of between 0 and 1 (ii) St.Davbefore is
the average St.D before message hiding and (iii) St.Davafter is the average St.D after
message hiding.
The inputs of the monitoring process are as follows:
• H: An (HTML encoded) webpage with dynamic content.
• α: A sensitivity factor, 0 < α < 1.
• T : The total training time.
• τ : The interval between webpage snapshot captures, for example every two hours.
• L: The length of the embedded message.
The actual monitoring process then comprises three steps:
1. Training Sequence Collection: Collect a series of snapshots of H with interval
τ over time period T to give the set C = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}
2. Threshold Calculation: Calculate the threshold σ as follows:
(a) For each si ∈ C compute the St.D of snapshot si, then embed a message
using some appropriate APS algorithm (in the evaluation presented later in
this chapter Shen et al. APS was used. the reason behind this is to investigate
other than Deogol APS algorithm which was used in both approaches L.Polak
and Z. Kotulski [65] and W.Jiang-feng et al. [95]).
(b) Compute the average of the St.Ds before embedding (St.Davbefore =
∑n
i=1 St.Di
n )
and the average of the St.Ds after embedding (St.Davafter =
∑n
i=1 St.Di
n );
Where n represents the number of snapshots
(c) The σ value is then calculated using equation 3.6.
3. Detecting: Compute the St.D value of each further collected instance of H and
compare it with σ; if St.D ≥ σ then the page is a stego webpage, otherwise the
webpage is clean.
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3.5 Evaluation of SD Concept
The results obtained from the evaluation of the proposed SD approach are presented in
this section. The objectives of the evaluation were as follows:
1. To confirm the conjecture that increases in the attribute position St.D of webpages
is indeed an indicator of APS regardless of the APS technique used.
2. To compare naturally occurring changes in St.D values caused by the changing
content of dynamic webpages with the changes caused by message embedding.
3. To test how different kinds of embedded messages might affect the proposed APS
detection mechanism.
4. To confirm that the attribute position St.D concept can be effectively used to
monitor webpages for APS.
The results obtained from experiments to establish the above objectives are presented
in Subsections 3.5.1 to 3.5.4 respectively.
3.5.1 Standard Deviation of HTML Files as an Indicator of APS
The experiments designed to establish that the attribute position St.D of webpages could
indeed be used to detect APS were founded on three “snapshots” of the landing page of
three well known websites: (i) Sony (ii) BBC and (iii) Wikipedia. This sample of three
webpages was selected from Monitoring dataset in Appendix A. In each case attribute
permutation steganography was used to embed hidden message using the algorithm
presented in Shen et al. [81] (as described previously in Chapter 2). Messages of different
length L were embedded from between 10% to 100% of the MEC, incrementing in steps
of 10%. The MEC for the BBC, Wikipedia, Sony pages were 70 bytes, 74 bytes and 117
bytes respectively.
The results are shown in Figure 3.1. In the figure the X-axis lists the message size as
a percentage of the MEC for each landing page, and the Y-axis the recorded St.D before
and after embedding. From the figure it can be observed that the St.D starts to increase,
with respect to the St.D for the landing page without any hidden message embedding,
as the size of the embedded message increases (obviously when the size of the embedded
message is 0% of the MEC the recorded St.D values will be the same). When the size of
the hidden message was equivalent to the MEC for each given landing page the recorded
increase in St.D equated to 13.1%, 14.6% and 21% respectively. Thus, from the above,
it was conclude that attribute position St.D can indeed be usefully employed for the
purpose of identifying attribute permutation steganography.
3.5.1.1 Standard Deviation Behavior Using a Range of APS Methods
This subsection presents the evaluation results obtained with respect to the investigation
conducted as to whether the fundamental idea of using attribute positions St.D as an
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Figure 3.1: Standard Deviation (St.D) of attribute positions with respect to messages
of different length
indicator of the presence or APS absence. The same landing pages and message length
(L) settings were used as in the case of the experiments reported on in the previous
section. Thus snapshots of the Sony, BBC and Wikipedia landing pages, and values
of L ranging 10% to 100% of the MEC incrementing in steps of 10%. APS message
embedding was conducted using both Huang et al.[45] and Deogol [80]. The results are
shown in Figure 3.2. On the left-hand side of the figure the results obtained with respect
to Huang et al. are given, and the right-hand side the results with respect to Deogol.
From Figure 3.2 it can be seen that in both cases the St.D values changed when
APS was applied and that the St.D difference increases as the hidden message length
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Figure 3.2: St.D values before and after the application of APS using: Huang et al.
(left) and Deogol (right)
increases. These results endorse the outcome from the previous set of experiments.
Supporting the conjecture that change in St.D can be usefully employed as an indicator
of APS.
3.5.2 Natural Changes in Standard Deviation vs Changes Caused by
Embedding
This Sub-section reports on the experiments conducted to compare naturally occurring
changes in St.D values, caused by the nature of the ever-changing content of dynamic
webpages, with St.D value changes caused by APS. For the experiments, Monitoring
dataset in Appendix A was used in its entirety. Recall that the dataset was constructed
using the following parameters: (i) T = one week and (ii) τ = every two hours. The
length of embedded message was L = 40% of webpage MEC. The St.D value was
calculated before and after message hiding using the APS algorithm of Shen et al.
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The results obtained with respect to a sample of eight of the Monitoring dataset in
Appendix A sequences are presented in Figure 3.3. In the Figure the X-axis gives the
index number (ID) for each snapshot in the given sequence, whilst the Y-axis gives the
recorded St.D value in each case. From the figure it can be seen that in every case
changes in the St.D values caused by message embedding, and the changes occurring
naturally, are significantly different. Thus conforming the utility of the proposed APS
detection mechanism, founded on attribute position change St.D, in the context of
monitoring dynamic webpage content.
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Figure 3.3: St.D values before (down) and after (up) message embedding for eight
selected webpages sequences from Monitoring dataset
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3.5.3 Effect of Different Types of Message Embedding
In the previous reported experiments, in each case, the same message type was embedded
(natural lowercase English text). The goal of the next series of experiments was to test
the effect of using a variety of different messages on APS detection performance using
the proposed attribute position SD mechanism. The Monitoring dataset in Appendix
A was again used, however, in this case the embedding was conducted using a variety
of different messages. In total 29 × 10 = 290 different messages were used; a mixture
of 29 natural English language messages and random messages (uppercase, lowercase,
numbers, symbols) and 10 different lengths ranging 10% to 100% of the MEC increasing
in steps of 10%. The results are presented in Table 3.3. In the table the “mean” row
gives the webpage averaged St.Ds after embedding, whilst the Sdeviation row gives the
standard deviation value for averaged St.Ds after embedding at each incrementing of
the hidden message. From the results presented in the table it can clearly be seen that
the nature of the hidden message does not have a adverse effect on APS detection.
Table 3.3: Before and after averaged St.D values using a variety of embedded mes-
sages
Length of embedded messages relative to a webpage MEC
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
mean 6.05 6.14 6.34 6.52 6.65 6.81 6.83 6.91 6.99 7.16
Sdeviation 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.17
3.5.4 Evaluation of the Monitoring Process
The final set of experiments reported on in this chapter was used to evaluate the usage of
the proposed SD mechanism in the context of webpage monitoring. This is the situation
where we wish to continuously check dynamic webpage content for the potential of APS.
Recall that the idea here was to first learn an appropriate detection threshold value σ.
The Monitoring dataset in Appendix A was again used but with the first 30 allocated
to training and the last 10 to testing. Message embedding, for evaluation purposes,
was conducted using Shen et al. APS. The embedded message was a natural English
language message. Once training was completed the effectiveness and sensitivity of the
monitoring process to both the length of the embedded message L and α could be tested.
The testing was conducted by embedding hidden English language messages using
APS, in the test set. Experiments were again conducted using different values for L
from L = 10% and increasing to L = 100% in steps of 10%.
Table 3.4 shows the values of St.D before (St.Db) and after (St.Da) embedding a
message of length 40% of a webpage MEC. Table 3.4 also shows how incrementing α
values from 0.1 to 0.9 will reduce the value of detection threshold σ for the webpages of
the Monitoring dataset in Appendix A.
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Table 3.4: Reducing APS detection threshold values σ when α increases
A webpage St.Db St.Da α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.3 α = 0.4 α = 0.5 α = 0.6 α = 0.7 α = 0.8 α = 0.9
www.bbc.co.uk 3.030 3.700 3.633 3.566 3.499 3.432 3.365 3.298 3.231 3.164 3.097
www.amazon.com 6.800 7.650 7.565 7.480 7.395 7.310 7.225 7.140 7.055 6.970 6.885
www.stackoverflow.com 2.400 3.400 3.300 3.200 3.100 3.000 2.900 2.800 2.700 2.600 2.500
www.ieee.org 5.840 6.500 6.434 6.368 6.302 6.236 6.170 6.104 6.038 5.972 5.906
www.wbmed.com 4.800 5.800 5.700 5.600 5.500 5.400 5.300 5.200 5.100 5.000 4.900
www.microsoft.com 4.900 5.600 5.530 5.460 5.390 5.320 5.250 5.180 5.110 5.040 4.970
www.liverpool.ac.uk 4.420 4.460 4.456 4.452 4.448 4.444 4.440 4.436 4.432 4.428 4.424
www.wikipedia.org 3.820 2.910 3.729 3.638 3.547 3.456 3.365 3.274 3.183 3.090 3.001
www.sony.com 5.300 4.100 5.180 5.060 4.940 4.820 4.700 4.580 4.460 4.340 4.220
www.ntimes 7.100 6.200 7.010 6.920 6.830 6.740 6.650 6.650 6.470 6.380 6.290
Table 3.5 shows the obtained results for one example of these webpages included,
namely the IEEE webpage. In Table 3.5 the testing results for 10 webpages of IEEE.org
using different obtained σ are presented. The table also shows that α values increases
from 0.1 to 0.9. The selected testing set was half seeded with APS with hidden messages
of length between 10% to 50% of a webpage MEC. From the table it can be noted that
when α = 0.1 and L = 40% the computed σ is 6.434 this is also shown in Table 3.4. Using
this thresold for testing faild to identify webpages with ID(6,7,8) as stego-webpages so
that False Negatives FN=3. When α = 0.9 the computed σ is 5.906 identifiedy webpages
with ID(2,3) as stego webpages while they are not so that False Positives FP=2.
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Steganography detection threshold δ 
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10 Stego 
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Table 3.5: False Positives FP and False Negatives FN for 10 tested webpages when
different values of σ and L = 40% of a webpage MEC
These results in Table 3.5 are also illustrated in Figure 3.4. The Figure shows how
the computed σ for L = 40% of a webpage MEC fails to identify stego-webpages with
hidden messages of length less than L (FN goes high). Also using high values of α will
cause identifying clean webpages as stego-webpages (FP goes high).
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Again the testing is repeated but this time for a hidden message length of L=60%.
Table 3.6 shows the obtained results for 10 webpages of IEEE.org using different σ.
The table also shows that α values increases from 0.1 to 0.9. Again the same previous
selected testing set was used. From the table it can be noted that how increasing of
L produces high σ which impacts the detection process (FN metric) when α is fixed.
Figure 3.5 depicts also this conclusion.
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Steganography detection threshold δ 
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Table 3.6: False Positives FP and False Negatives FN for 10 tested webpages when
different values of σ and L = 60% of a webpage MEC
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Figure 3.4: Derived detection threshold σ using different values for α when L = 40%
of the webpage MEC
3.6 Summary
In this chapter the proposed SD approach for detecting APS has been presented. The
approach is directed at the monitoring of dynamic webpages for APS. The fundamental
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Figure 3.5: Detection threshold σ sensitivity of different values of L while α = 0.5
idea was that a change in the standard deviation (St.D) value for a given webpage would
be an indicator of the existence of APS. More specifically that if the St.D value increased
above some specified threshold σ, APS could be said to exist. A particular challenge was
determining what the value for the σ threshold, to facilitate APS detection, should be; a
“one-size-fits-all threshold value was found to be inappropriate. The idea was to identify
a mechanism whereby the σ value for a particular WWW page could be learnt. This
process was fully described together with the evaluation conducted to determine whether
the conjecture that the monitoring St.D values can be used to detect the presence of
APS was correct or not. The reported evaluation results indicated that the conjecture
was correct; the Standard Deviation of a webpage could indeed be usefully employed
for the detection of APS. The next chapter presents the proposed APCC approach for
APS detection; an alternative to the SD mechanism present in this chapter for use in
the non-monitoring context.
Chapter 4
APS Detection Using Attribute
Position Changes Count
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the proposed Attribute Position Changes Count (APCC) APS detec-
tion mechanism is presented. APCC is directed at detecting APS in the static context
(whereas the SD approach presented in the previous chapter was directed at dynamic
context). The APCC mechanism adopts a classification approach to APS detection.
The main idea is to train a classification model which can then be used to differentiate
between WWW pages as being either “stego pages” or “normal pages”. This approach
is inspired by the work of W.Jian-feng et al. in [95] who also proposed a classification
based approach to APS detection in the static context. In [95] a collection of webpages
were used for evaluation purposes with APS applied using Deogol [80]. The classification
model used was a Support Vector Machines (SVM) model.
Classification is a well understood branch of Machine learning [9], the challenge is
how best to transform the application focused data into a format appropriate for a
classifier generation. Most generators take, as input, a feature vector representation of
some sort. In the context of APS detection the requirement is thus to represent attribute
data in a feature vector format. The feature vector used in by W.Jian-feng et al. in
[95] comprised: (i) distance between the mean of the attribute positions in a benchmark
webpage to the mean of the same attribute positions in a suspicious webpage and (ii) the
attribute positions variance. However, it is argued here that using average position values
ignores the spread of position changes, which may in turn be important in the context
of APS detection; in other words important information may be lost when using average
values. Instead, the proposed APCC mechanism, as the name suggests, uses the concept
of attribute position changes count. The idea is motivated by the observation that APS
entails frequent attribute position changes which can thus be used to distinguish APS
WWW pages from non-APS WWW pages. The APCC metric is fully described later
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in this chapter together with how it was incorporated into the APCC APS detection
approach.
The proposed approach was evaluated using the Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix
A and three different classifier generation models. The dataset was seeded using the three
most commonly referenced APS approaches, namely: (i) Deogol [80], (ii) Huang et al.
[45] and (iii) Shen et al. [81] (see Chapter 2). As a consequence three variations of the
dataset were produced labeled using the name of the APS algorithm used for message
hiding: (i) Deogol, (ii) Huang et al. and (iii) Shen et al. The three classification
paradigms used were: (i) Neural Networks, (ii) SVM and (iii) Naive Bayes. In each case
the operation of the proposed APCC approach was compared with three alternative
APS detection algorithms: (i) L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65] , (ii) Sedeeq et al. [79] (see
Chapter 2) and (iii) W.Jian-feng et al. [95].
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 demonstrates the
APS effect on the attribute positions in an HTML file and how this can be utilized
to introduce APCC metric. Section 4.3 presents the proposed classification model for
APS steganalysis using the APCC approach. Section 4.4 then presents the evaluation
of proposed APCC approach. Finally Section 4.5 gives a summary of the chapter.
4.2 The Attribute Position Change Count Concept
The concept of APS was introduced in earlier chapters where it was also noted that in
normal circumstances (no steganography present) attributes within HTML tags tend to
feature a consistent ordering, but once APS has taken place a consistent ordering is no
longer the case. To formalize the Attribute Position Change Count (APCC) concept we
allocate a position number to each attribute within a tag, the first position is given the
number 0, the second position 1 and so on. Thus, given an attribute ai belonging to
the set of attributes A featured in a HTML page this will have a set positions Pai =
{p1, p2, . . . } associated with it. In the absence of APS we would expect the values in P
to be more constant. Thus it is conjectured that by counting the number of attribute
position changes we have an indicator of the presence (or otherwise) of APS. We calculate
the position change count for an attribute as follows by comparing consecutive positions;
if there is a change in position we increment the change count for that attribute by 1.
Thus, given two consecutive positions for an attribute, pj and pj+1, we increment the
position change count so far by 1 if pj 6= pj+1.
The APCC concept is illustrated in Table 4.1 with respect to a fictitious website, and
two attributes: (i) content1 and (ii) rel2. The second column in Table 4.1 shows the
positions of the attributes in the HTML document that might exist if no APS has taken
place. Note that the first attribute features 9 times and the second 15 times (hence
1The content attribute is used with the meta HTML tag to provide additional information that can
be used by, for example, www browsers.
2The rel attribute specifies the relationship between the current document and the linked document
in a link HTM tag
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Table 4.1: Attribute position changes before and after APS
Attribute Att. pos. Apcc Att. pos. Apcc
before APS before APS after APS after APS
content 111111111 0 101001010 7
rel 000000000001111 1 101000110104242 11
9 and 15 positions respectively). The third column then lists the associated position
changes count. The forth column shows the positions of the attributes in the HTML
document that might exist if APS has taken place, whilst the fifth column shows the
associated position changes count. Note that a clear distinction can be observed before
and after APS (at least in this example).
Table 4.2 presents the attribute position changes count for the first three attributes in
ten selected webpages before and after ASP embedding.
Table 4.2: First three APCC values in selected webpages before and after APS em-
bedding
Webpage
Apcc before Apcc after Apcc after Apcc after
embedding applying applying applying
Huang et al. [45]) Deogol [80] Shen et al. [81]
www.wikipedia.org 2, 2, 6 12, 20, 15 14, 25, 16 17, 12, 11
www.stackoverflow.com 2, 12, 13 14, 14, 16 18, 16, 23 20, 8, 23
www.ieee.com 9, 2, 0 18, 15, 7 15, 15, 6 19, 18, 10
www.sony.com 4, 4, 3 14, 5, 1 1, 5, 15 16, 13, 17
www.bbc.com 14, 6, 3 12, 15, 19 19, 15, 16 17, 12, 11
www.dhl.com 7, 7, 7 9, 6, 11 7, 7, 13 13, 20, 18
www.linkedin.com 14, 4, 0 12, 3, 15 17, 8, 15 14, 9, 16
www.microsoft.com 4, 6, 16 5, 20, 10 5, 21, 10 9, 11, 17
www.sears.com 11, 4, 0 16, 9, 0 7, 16, 0 13, 18, 16
www.ox.ac.uk 7, 6, 14 10, 19, 18 11, 19, 16 16, 8, 19
The webpages were selected from the Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix A used for
the evaluation of the proposed APCC approach discussed later in this chapter. A short
English language message of 17 characters was embedded in each case using the selected
APS algorithms: Huang et al., Deogol and Shen et al. Column 2 in the table gives
the APCC in each case before embedding, whilst columns 3, 4 and 5 give the APCC
values after embedding using each APS algorithm. From the Table it can be clearly
seen, in most cases, that the APCC values after embedding a message are higher than
the value before embedding. This idea is thus to use the APCC concept as a mechanism
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for detecting the presence (or otherwise) of APS. From the table it can also be noted
that in some cases the APCC value decreased after embedding had taken place, this
was attributed to the different implementations of the individual attribute permutation
APS algorithms that were used.
4.3 Proposed APCC Classification Approach for APS Ste-
ganalysis
Given the above, the idea is to use attribute position changes count information to
generate feature vectors and, given an appropriately defined training set featuring both
stego and non-stego WWW pages, to train a classification model for APS detection.
There are many algorithms available that can be used to build classification models
(also known as prediction models). Common examples include: (i) Neural Networks,
(ii) Support Vector Machines and (iii) Naive Bayes. What these algorithms have in
common is that they take as input a set of feature vectors of length n generated from an
n-dimensional feature space. In our case the feature space represents the set of attributes
A that we wish to consider. Each dimension represents an attribute whose values range
from 0 to some maximum number of possible position changes count.
The required training data comprises an n × m matrix where n is the number of
webpages in the training set and m is the number of attributes to be considered. The
value associated with each attribute is the position changes count generated as described
above. Before presenting the proposed algorithm used for counting the attribute position
changes, the following definitions should be noted:
• H: An input webpage.
• S: A set of tags T in H that have two attributes or more, S = {T1, T2, . . . }.
• FV : The generated feature vector of all tag attribute position changes count in S.
• attPositions(ai): The array of positions in S for attribute ai, attPositions(ai)
=[p1, p2, . . . pm].
• apcc(ai): The number of position changes for an attribute (ai), incremented when
pj 6= pj+1.
The pseudo code for generating APCC feature vector is presented in Algorithm 5. The
input to the algorithm is a WWW page H. The output is FV , a feature vector recording
the number of attributes position changes with respect to all the tags within S, the set
of tags with two attributes or more. The algorithm commences by finding S (line 3).
Next (lines 5 to 9) the algorithm loops through each tag T in S, and each attribute
ai in each tag, and records the attribute ai positions in attPositions(ai) array using
collectPositions(ai) function. Next (lines 10 to 16) the algorithm loops through each
attPositions(ai) array to calculate the attribute ai position changes count apcc according
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to the positions value associated with it. Each calculated apcc value is stored in FV
to generate the desired feature vector for the webpage. Note also that for the training
data each feature vector has a class label associated with it: class 1 represents a stego
webpage while class 2 represents a normal webpage.
Algorithm 5: APCC feature vector generation algorithm
1: Input: H
2: Output: FV a feature vector holding position changes count for attributes in H
3: Find S The set of tags T with two attributes or more
4: k=0
5: for each tag T ∈ S do
6: i=1
7: for each attribute ai ∈ T do
8: if notSeenBefore(ai) then
9: apcc=0
10: attPositions(ai)=collectPositions(ai)
11: j=1
12: for each position pj in attPositions(ai) do
13: if pj 6= pj+1 then
14: apcc = apcc+ 1
15: j=j+1
16: end if
17: end for
18: FV [k] = apcc
19: k = k + 1
20: end if
21: i = i+ 1
22: end for
23: end for
4.4 Evaluation of Proposed APCC Approach
To evaluate the proposed APCC approach the Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix
A was used. The conjectured advantage of the proposed approach was that it would
operate well regardless of how the APS was conducted. To demonstrate this the three
most commonly used and referenced APS algorithms in literature, identified in Chapter
2, were again used to generate three evaluation datasets: (i) Deogol, (ii) Huang and (iii)
Shen. In each case half of the selected WWW pages were seeded using APS. In this case
the hidden message was a natural text message of 35 characters in length.
For the purpose of incorporating APS five tag attributes were selected. Consequently
the feature vectors had five “slots” each holding a position changes count. Thus the
entire data matrix in each case measured 150 × 5 (150 because this was the number of
webpages included in the non-monitoring dataset).
For the evaluation Ten-fold Cross Validation (TCV) was used throughout whereby
the input data was divided into 10 folds and the classifier generation process conducted
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and tested 10 times, each time using a different fold for the testing. The evaluation
metrics used were those recommended in [23], namely:
• Accuracy (Acc); the percentage of correctly classified samples.
• The Area Under the receiver operator characteristic Curve (AUC); a measure of
the area under the graphical plot of the true positives rate versus the false positives
rate.
The objectives of the evaluation were as follows:
1. To analyze the effectiveness of the proposed APCC mechanism in terms of a num-
ber of common APS algorithms and a number of classification model generators.
2. To determine the effect of the nature of the embedded message type, and its length,
on the classification models.
3. To determine whether the results obtained, with respect to the experiments con-
ducted to address the previous objective, were statistically significant or not.
4. To compare the operation of the proposed approach with alternative monitoring
approaches proposed in the literature, namely the approaches of L.Polak and Z.
Kotulski [65] and Sedeeq et al. [79] (presented in Chapter 3) and with alternative
non-monitoring approaches proposed in the literature, namely that of W.Jian-feng
et al.[95].
The conducted evaluation with respect to each objective is considered in further details
in Sub-sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4 below.
4.4.1 Effectiveness of the APCC Approach
For the first of the above objectives three classifier generation models were considered,
as implemented in the Weka machine learning environment [32]: (i) Multi-Layer Per-
ceptron (MLP) Neural Network, (ii) SVM and (iii) Naive Bayes NB. Default settings
for the MLP and SVM classifiers in WEKA software were used and as follows: for MLP
classifier the parameters were as follows: one hidden layer, learning rate=0.3, momen-
tum=0.2 and number of epoches=500, while SVM classifier parameters were: complexity
parameter c=1 and tolerance parameter=0.001. Note that SVM was used because this
was the classification model used with respect to the APS detection approach proposed
by W.Jian-feng et al. [95]. Recall that the significance of the later is that, to the best
knowledge of the author, this is the only other previous work that adopts a classification
model approach to APS detection; however, as already noted, using a very different
feature vector representation. The results are summarized in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 (best
results highlighted in bold font). Table 4.3 shows the results obtained in terms of av-
erage Accuracy (Acc) while Table 4.4 shows the results obtained in terms of the AUC
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measure. The averaged standard deviation of both Acc and AUC for each fold of 10-
TCV is in parentheses. From the tables it can be seen that the proposed APCC feature
vector representation can be successfully used to train classifiers to distinguish between
normal webpages and stego webpages, regardless of the adopted APS algorithm. The
best performance was obtained with respect to the APS algorithm of Shen et al. From
the tables it can also be seen that there is little difference in operation between the
selected classifier generators.
Table 4.3: Average accuracy (Acc) using APCC (best results highlighted in bold font)
APS Algorithm MLP SVM NB
Deogol [80] 93.39% 90.71% 90.89%
(9.71) (10.54) (10.46)
Haung et al. [45] 90.36% 93.21% 88.75%
(11.17) (7.18) (13.10)
Shen et al. [81] 93.57% 96.07% 93.57%
(10.75) (6.34) (10.75)
Table 4.4: Average AUC using APCC (best results highlighted in bold font)
APS Algorithm MLP SVM NB
Deogol [80] 0.97 0.90 0.98
(0.06) (0.11) (0.05)
Haung et al. [45] 0.94 0.91 0.96
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07)
Shen et al. [81] 0.99 0.95 0.99
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
4.4.2 The Effect of Different Message Type and Length Embedding
To investigate the effect of the nature of the hidden message, and its length, on the
APS detection process two sets of experiments were conducted, the first using English
language embedded messages and the second using random messages (a mixture of
uppercase, lowercase letters and numbers). In each case the length of the embedded
message was varied ranging from between 10% to 100% of Maximum Embedding Ca-
pacity (MEC) incrementing in steps of 10%, although only results for lengths of 10% to
50% of the MEC are presented here because beyond this no change in the results was
detected. At each incrementing step ten different hidden messages were considered. The
embedding algorithms used, as in the case of earlier experiments, were: (i) Deogol, (ii)
Haung et al. and (iii) Shen et al.
The same classifier generators as considered with respect to the previously reported
experiment were also used: (i) Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) Neural Network, (ii) SVM
and (iii) Naive Bayes NB. For each APS algorithm two datasets were generated, one using
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natural English language text embedding and one using random text embedding. Each
dataset comprised 5 sub-datasets each containing message of different length as it is
shown in Table 4.5 column 1 in Sub-section 4.4.3.
The results obtained, using MLP, SVM and NB, are summarized in Figures 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3 respectively. In each case the graphs on the left were generated using English
language texts (the first set of experiments) and the graphs on the right using random
text (the second set of experiments). As in the case of the graphs used to report the
outcomes of the experiments reported on earlier in this chapter, the X-axis represents
the message length (expressed as a percentage of MEC) and the Y-axis represents the
accuracy and AUC. Inspection of the figures firstly indicates that the results were con-
sistent with the results presented previously in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. More specifically the
results confirmed the following:
• The proposed APCC approach can successfully be used to train classifiers to dis-
tinguish between stego and non-stego webpages, regardless of the APS algorithm
used.
• The nature of the embedded messages, random or otherwise, has no significant
effect on the performance of the classifiers.
• With respect to the length of the embedded message this has a significant impact
on classifier performance when the APS algorithm of Shen et al. is used. This is
considered as an advantage of using the APS algorithm of Shen et al. because it
it is hard to be detected with short messages.
4.4.3 Statistical Evaluation
This subsection reports on the experiments conducted to determine whether the ob-
tained results presented in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 were indeed statistically significant,
and not purely a matter of chance. There are several available statistical tests avail-
able to compare the operation of classifiers. Demsar, in his comprehensive study [23]
concluded that non-parametric statistical tests are the most appropriate for comparing
classification algorithms over multiple datasets.
With respect to the work presented in this sub-section the Friedman non-parametric
statistical test was adopted. In this test each classifiers performance, with respect to
each dataset, is ranked. The best performing classifier is assigned a rank (r) of 1, the
second is a rank of r = 2 and so. The Friedman test statistic is calculated using Equation
4.1[90] [26].
X2F =
12N
K(K + 1)
[
k∑
j=1
Rj − K(K + 1)
2
4
]
(4.1)
Where: (i) Rj =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ri is the average rank of the classifier over the used datasets,
(ii) N is the number of used datasets, (iii) K is the number of classifiers and (vi) ri is
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Figure 4.1: Performance of MLP classifier for detecting APS. Left: natural English
language messages embedding. Right: random messages embedding
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Figure 4.2: Performance of SVM classifier for detecting APS. Left: natural English
language messages embedding. Right: random messages embedding
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Figure 4.3: Performance of NB classifier for detecting APS. Left: natural English
language messages embedding. Right: random messages embedding
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the rank of the jth classifier with respect to the ith dataset. The Friedman statistic X
2
F
is distributed according to the Chi-Squared distribution with K − 1 degrees of freedom
(df). The test is used to evaluate classifiers performance so that the null-hypothesis,
H0, that there is no significant difference between classifiers can be accepted or rejected.
The null hypothesis is rejected if the X2F value is greater than the “null distribution”.
This is a pre-determined distribution with a most commonly used cut-off (significance
level) value of α = 0.05 [22, 29].
Also, for null hypothesis testing a p-value is used to weigh the strength of the evidence
against the null hypothesis. Therefore low values of p ≤ α provide strong evidence
against the null hypothesis, in which case H0 can be rejected; while high values of p > α
indicate weak evidence against the null hypothesis, in which case H0 is accepted. When
H0 is rejected an alternative hypothesis H1, that there is a significant difference between
classifiers, is established and a post-hoc test is applied to determine which classifier is
significantly better than the others.
Several post-hoc tests can be adopted for this purpose [23], however the Nemenyi
post-hoc test was adopted. The Nemenyi test holds that there is a statistically signifi-
cance difference between the performance of classifiers if the difference between classifier
average ranks is equal to or greater than a “Critical Difference” (CD) between them.
The critical difference is computed using the following equation [90] [26].
CD = qα
√
K(K + 1)
6N
(4.2)
Where the value for critical value qα is taken from the table given in Figure 4.4. This
table shows the critical value qα at both significance levels α = 0.05 and α = 0.01
according to the number of used classifiers.
For the purpose of the significance testing the AUC results from the experiments
reported in Sub-section 4.4.2 were used (see also Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). The resulting
Friedman test outcomes are given in Table 4.5 which gives the Friedman test statistics
when embedding both natural English and random messages using the three considered
APS techniques. Column 1 in Table 4.5 lists the datasets used, recall that each dataset
consisted of five sub-datasets as noted in column 2. The APS algorithm used to embed
the messages and the nature of the embedded messages are shown in columns 3 and 4
respectively. The previously obtained AUC values, using MLP, SVM and NB, are given
in columns 5, 6 and 7. In each case the Chi-Square Friedman test statistics and the
associated p-values are given in columns 7 and 8 respectively.
From Table 4.5 it can be seen that all p-values are less than or equal to the signifi-
cance level of α = 0.05; therefore the null-hypothesis (H0), that there is no significant
difference in the operation of the classifiers, can be rejected. It can be also noted from
Table 4.5 that for all generated datasets the highest average rank was obtained using
the NB classifier, followed by MLP and then SVM. Then, according to Friedman test
the rank given to NB is 1, MLP is 2 and SVM is 3. Since as mentioned that (H0) can
be rejected accordingly the Nemenyi post-hoc test was applied. The critical difference
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Figure 4.4: Critical values for Nemenyi test [23]
(CD) between the classifiers was calculated using Equation 4.2. Applying this equation
with the following parameters: (K = 3 the number of classifiers, N = 5 the number of
sub-datasets and q = 2.343 from Figure 4.4) will give CD = 1.4.
Table 4.5: Friedman test results using AUC values
Main Sub-Data APS Embedded MLP SVM NB Chi-Sequare p-value
Datasets Sets Algorithm Messages AUC
8.316 0.016
huangNatural
Ds10%
Huang et.al Natural English text
0.78 0.77 0.78
Ds20% 0.82 0.80 0.83
Ds30% 0.87 0.79 0.90
Ds40% 0.81 0.80 0.90
Ds50% 0.87 0.78 0.82
Average Rank 0.83 0.78 0.84
huangRandom
Ds10%
Huang et.al Random text
0.82 0.69 0.72
6.000 0.050
Ds20% 0.82 0.81 0.88
Ds30% 0.78 0.78 0.87
Ds40% 0.83 0.82 0.87
Ds50% 0.76 0.81 0.92
Average Rank 0.80 0.78 0.85
deogolNatural
Ds10%
Deogol Natural English text
0.85 0.76 0.80
6.632 0.036
Ds20% 0.82 0.82 0.90
Ds30% 0.97 0.76 0.93
Ds40% 0.92 0.80 0.93
Ds50% 0.92 0.80 0.95
Average Rank 0.89 0.78 0.90
deogolRandom
Ds10%
Deogol Random text
0.85 0.76 0.80
6.000 0.050
Ds20% 0.82 0.82 0.90
Ds30% 0.87 0.79 0.92
Ds40% 0.79 0.82 0.91
Ds50% 0.83 0.81 0.92
Average Rank 0.83 0.80 0.89
shenNatural
Ds10%
Shen et. al Natural English text
0.73 0.75 0.78
6.706 0.035
Ds20% 0.92 0.86 0.92
Ds30% 0.98 0.92 0.98
Ds40% 0.95 0.94 0.98
Ds50% 1.00 0.94 1.00
Average Rank 0.91 0.88 0.93
shenRandom
Ds10%
Shen et.al Random text
0.68 0.67 0.78
9.000 0.011
Ds20% 0.85 0.85 0.98
Ds30% 0.97 0.88 1.00
Ds40% 0.93 0.92 0.95
Ds50% 1.00 0.92 1.00
Average Rank 0.88 0.84 0.94
A visualization of Nemenyi test for results in Table 4.5 is given in Figure 4.5. The
figure displays the ranked classifiers along with the critical difference. From the figure it
can be clearly seen that NB is the best performing classifier, however this is statistically
significant only with respect to SVM and not significant to MLP (the CD tails overlap).
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Figure 4.5: Visualization of Nemenyi test results from Table 4.5
4.4.4 Comparisons with Other Detection Approaches
With respect to the fourth objective, comparisons with the operation of alternative APS
detection mechanisms in the context of the dynamic (monitoring) context with respect
to the operation of: (i) L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65] and (ii) Sedeeq et al. [79] (details in
Chapter 3) and with the operation of the approach of W.Jian-feng et al. [95] in the static
(non-monitoring) context were conducted. The results are presented and discussed in
this sub-section. The Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix A was used as before. For
each APS algorithm half of the dataset was seeded with hidden messages. In the case of
L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65], the detection method was adapted so that feature vectors
were generated comprised of W values. Recall that W is the ratio of HTML attribute
pairs that occurs in different orderings from the total number of HTML attribute pairings
(see Chapter 2). Each webpage was thus represented by a single statistical feature W
calculated as described in Chapter 2. In the case of Sedeeq et al.[79], the detection
method was adapted so that feature vectors were generated comprised of the standard
deviation St.D values as described in Chapter 3. This resulted in each webpage being
represented by one feature, the standard deviation of attribute positions.
With respect to the approach of W.Jian-feng et al. [95], this detection approach, as
described in Chapter 2, adopted a classification model to classify single webpage snap-
shots as either clean or stego webpages in the non-monitoring context. Recall that the
distinction between the monitoring and non-monitoring context is that in the monitor-
ing context sequence of webpage snapshots are considered while in the non-monitoring
context single webpage snapshots are considered. For comparison with W.Jian-feng et
al. feature vectors were generated in the same manner as described in Chapter 2 using
two statistics: (i) the distance between the attribute mean position benchmark and the
sample attribute mean position of the webpage in question and (ii) the variance of the
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Table 4.6: Operation of L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65] and (ii) Sedeeq et al. [79]
without classifiers
APS detection approach
Deogol Huang et al. Shen et al.
[80] [45] [81]
Acc AUC Acc AUC Acc AUC
L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65] 75.00% 0.74 51.00% 0.51 56.00% 0.56
Sedeeq et al. [79] 81.00% 0.81 51.00% 0.50 56.00% 0.56
attribute positions. Note that with respect to the reimplementation of the detection ap-
proach in [95] the same three parameters for attributes selection were used as mentioned
in Chapter 2: (i) the number of attributes to be considered (BA), (ii) the number of
attribute appearances in terms of mean distance (TD) and (iii) the number of attribute
appearance in terms of variance (TV). The values used for these parameters were those
recommended in [95]: (i) BA = 3, (ii) TD = 3 and (iii) TV = 3.
Two experiments were conducted the first experiment was to investigate the opera-
tion of alternative APS detection mechanisms (i) L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65] and (ii)
Sedeeq et al. [79] (details in Chapter 3) without using the classifiers and the results are
shown in Table 4.6. The used detection threshold to distinguish between clean webpages
and stego-webpges is computed using the average of the (St.Ds) and (Ws) of the stego
webpages. The Table shows that the proposed approach of Sedeeq et al. (Chapter 3)
performed better than the approach of L.Polak and Z. Kotulski in terms of detection
accuracy. Both detection approaches performed poorly in terms of AUC metric.
The second experiment was conducted to compare the operation of APCC with the
other detection approaches L.Polak and Z. Kotulski [65], Sedeeq et al. [79] and W.Jian-
feng et al.[95], also to investigate the operation of both approaches in L.Polak and Z.
Kotulski [65], Sedeeq et al. using the classifiers. For the evaluation, the three APS
algorithms considered previously (Deogol, Huang et al. and Shen et al.) and the three
classifier generation paradigms considered previously (Neural Network MLP, SVM and
Naive Bayes NB) were again used. Thus nine different combinations were considered.
The results are presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Comparison of APCC results with other detection approaches (best results
highlighted in bold font)
Classifier Detection Approach in APS Algorithm
Deogol Huang et al. Shen et al.
[80] [45] [81]
Acc AUC Acc AUC Acc AUC
MLP
L. Polak and Z.Kotulski [65] 74.64% 0.78 47.32% 0.48 44.46% 0.33
Sedeeq et al.[79] 75.36% 0.88 68.10% 0.84 61.37% 0.65
W. Jian-feng et al. [95] 86.61% 0.93 78.93% 0.91 77.32% 0.88
APCC 93.39% 0.97 90.36% 0.94 93.57% 0.99
SVM
L.Polak and Z.Kotulski [65] 61.96% 0.65 48.57% 0.50 47.32% 0.46
Sedeeq et al. [79] 76.79% 0.77 74.70% 0.74 58.10% 0.59
W. Jian-feng et al.[95] 88.04% 0.88 81.43% 0.82 75.54% 0.75
APCC 90.71% 0.90 93.21% 0.91 96.07% 0.95
NB
L.Polak and Z.Kotulski [65] 70.63% 0.75 51.43% 0.47 51.61% 0.53
Sedeeq et al. [79] 78.04% 0.89 74.70% 0.84 61.01% 0.65
W. Jian-feng et al.[95] 91.96% 0.99 89.64% 0.91 79.82% 0.89
APCC 90.89% 0.98 88.75% 0.96 93.57% 0.99
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Inspection of Table 4.7 indicates that, with respect to accuracy Acc, the APCC
approach produced best results in seven of nine cases; and, with respect to AUC, the
best result in eight of the nine cases. It is interesting to note that the proposed approach
of Sedeeq et al. (Chapter 3) performed better than the approach of L.Polak and Z.
Kotulski (however both detection approaches performed better without classifiers see
Table 4.6. From Table 4.7 it is also interesting to note that, although the authors
of the W.Jian-feng et al. detection approach considered only SVM classification [95],
their detection approach produced a better performance (in some cases better than the
proposed APCC algorithm) when Naive Bayes classification was applied.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter the Attribute Position Changes Count (APCC) APS detection approach
has been presented. This approach offers the dual advantages that: (i) it serves to
capture more detail concerning APS than methods that use average statistical values
and (ii) it can be readily used to generate feature vectors with which to train an APS
classification model. The evaluation was conducted by considering three alternative APS
methods and three classifier generation paradigms (thus three-by-three combinations).
Comparisons were presented between the proposed APCC approach and two alternative
APS detection approaches in the monitoring context, and between the proposed APCC
approach and an alternative APS detection approach in the non-monitoring context. In
each case the proposed APCC APS detection approach produced the best results, with
respect to accuracy (Acc.) and AUC, in the majority of cases thus indicating the viability
of the proposed approach. The next chapter presents the Detect Invisible Characters
(DIC) detection approach for Invisible Characters Steganography (ICS) detection.
Chapter 5
A Prediction Model for Invisible
Characters Detection
5.1 Introduction
In Chapters 3 and 4 the proposed SD and APCC algorithms were presented, both
were directed at Attribute Permutation Steganography (APS). This chapter considers
a different form of HTML steganography, Invisible Characters Steganography (ICS) or
Open Space Steganography (OSS) both introduced in Chapter 2. More specifically this
chapter presents the Detect Invisible Characters (DIC) detection approach. The mode
of operation of this approach is similar to the APCC non-monitoring approach presented
in the previous chapter. The idea is to build a classifier that uses frequency distribution
of continuous sequences (segments) of white space characters, of different lengths, to
distinguish between normal webpages and stego webpages.
Recall from Chapter 2 that HTML browsers ignore space characters when rendering
webpages. ICS utilizes this feature of HTML browsers for message (data) hiding. The
proposed DIC approach, presented in this chapter, is based on an idea first suggested
in Sui and Luo [68], namely that the embedding of a message using white space char-
acters will affect the frequency distributions of continuous white space characters used
in sequences; an observation that holds regardless of the adopted ICS method used to
hide data. The main challenge of ICS detection in WWW pages is the large number of
white space characters that will normally exists, regardless of whether embedding has
taken place or not.
Two previously proposed alternative ICS detection approaches, that of Sui and Luo
[68] and Huang et al.[43] were described in Chapter 2. Both approaches used probabilistic
models to identify HTML ICS. Both were used for comparison purposes with respect to
the evaluation of the proposed DIC approach (reported on later in this chapter).
As also noted previously in Chapter 2, there are several steganography tools that
can be used to hide messages in HTML files using ICS. Of these wbStego4open and
SNOW are freely available for download and hence were used in the context of the
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evaluation presented later in this chapter. SNOW utilizes end-of-line spacing to hide
data, whilst wbStego4open makes use of both inter-word spacing and inter-sentence-
spacing to embed data. Unlike SNOW, the wbStego4open tool also checks that the
cover file is large enough to accommodate the desired hidden message.
The proposed DIC approach used the Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix A to
generate two WWW datasets. Two evaluation datasets were derived from this dataset,
the first seeded with hidden messages using wbStego4open and the second seeded with
hidden messages using SNOW. These two datasets were used to evaluate the proposed
DIC approach detailed later in this chapter. As in the case of the APCC approach
described in the foregoing chapter, the operation of the proposed DIC approach was
also considered in the context of three different classifier generation models: (i) Neural
Networks, (ii) SVM and (iii) Naive Bayes with the same settings in WEKA software
(for MLP classifier the parameters were as follows: one hidden layer, learning rate=0.3,
momentum=0.2 and number of epoches=500, while SVM classifier parameters were:
complexity parameter c=1 and tolerance parameter=0.001).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents an analysis of
the alternative ICS detection approaches considered later in this chapter with respect
to the evaluation of the DIC approach. Section 5.3 provides a full description of the
idea behind the DIC method. Section 5.4 then presents the evaluation of the proposed
approach. Finally Section 5.5 concludes the chapter with a brief summary.
5.2 Analysis of Existing Methods
As noted in Chapter 2, previous work on ICS detection can be found in Sui and Luo [68]
and Huang et al. [43]. The work presented in this section commences with an analysis
of these existing approaches in the context of whether or not their operation could be
improved upon, and if so how this might be achieved. To analyze the two approaches
ICS was applied using both SNOW and wbStego4open to half of the the Non-Monitoring
dataset in Appendix A using a 72 characters English language text. In this manner two
datasets were generated, Dws and Dsnow, of 150 webpages each.
Recall, from Chapter 2, that Sui and Lou used two occurrence probabilities: (i) ptsco,
the probability of a white space character occurrence; and (ii) pscso, the probability of
a white space character sequence occurrence. The value of ptsco and pscso is calculated
using Equations 5.1 and 5.2 respectively (repeated from Chapter 2).
ptsco(W ) =
Nws
Nallchar
(5.1)
pscso(W ) =
Nwss
Nws
(5.2)
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where:
• Nws: Is the number of white space characters in W webpage.
• Nallchar: Is the number of all characters in W webpage.
• Nwss: Is the number of space character sequences in W webpage.
The idea thus was to calculate these probabilities before and after suspected em-
bedding of a hidden message. If no embedding had taken place the before and after
values would of course be the same. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 show the before and after
embedding values of ptsco and pscso obtained with respect to six of the sample webpages
in Dws and Dsnow where message hiding had taken place. Column 1 in 5.1 gives the
white space character occurrence probability ptsco before embedding while Column 1 in
5.2 gives the white space character sequence occurrences probability pscso. Both tables
give the same probabilities in columns 3 and 4 after embedding had taken place using
ICS tools wbStego4open and SNOW, respectively. From the tables it can clearly be
seen that all probabilities increased after embedding had taken place and there is a wide
variation in the range of ptsco and pscso values obtained. A full analysis with respect to
both datasets confirmed this result. A summary of this analysis, with respect to the ICS
seeded WWW pages, is given in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. Each figure shows two “box
plots” one for each set of ICS seeded WWW pages. Note that a box plot is a diagram
used for displaying the distribution of data in terms of five limits [1]: (i) minimum, (ii)
first quartile, (iii) median, (iv) third quartile and (v) maximum. Inspection of both fig-
ures confirms that the range of ptsco and pscso values is substantial. Thus it would seem
that using a ptsco and pscso static threshold values to detect ICS, as proposed by Sui and
Luo[68], is unlikely to provide good ICS detection results because of this variability.
Table 5.1: The probability of white space character occurrence probability ptsco in
selected webpages before and after embedding
Webpage
ptsco Dws DSNOW
before embedding ptsco ptsco
www.bbc.co.uk 0.090 0.094 0.092
www.bbc.co.uk /weather 0.171 0.189 0.173
www.linkedin.com 0.032 0.078 0.046
www.cnn.com 0.046 0.053 0.048
www.liverpool.ac.uk 0.118 0.156 0.135
www.wikipedia.com 0.041 0.087 0.057
In the case of the approach proposed in Huang et al. [43], as described in Chapter
2, used the concept of “embedding rate” (erate). This is the ratio between the length of
a hidden message M and the size of a given WWW page Wallchar. M = size of a given
webpage Wallchar - size of a given webpage with invisible characters removed (Wwithout).
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Table 5.2: The probability of white space character sequence occurrences pscso in
selected webpages before and after embedding
Webpage
pscso Dws DSNOW
before embedding pscso pscso
www.bbc.co.uk 0.031 0.035 0.032
www.bbc.co.uk /weather 0.055 0.057 0.056
www.linkedin.com 0.002 0.031 0.015
www.cnn.com 0.033 0.036 0.034
www.liverpool.ac.uk 0.078 0.087 0.079
www.wikipedia.com 0.002 0.028 0.014
Figure 5.1: Box plots for ptsco
Figure 5.2: Box plots for pscso
Embedding rate of a given webpage erate(W ) can be calculated using Equation 5.3.
erate(W ) =
M
Wallchar
(5.3)
Table 5.3 shows the before and after embedding values of the embedding rate erate
obtained with respect to six of the sample webpages in Dws and Dsnow where message
hiding had taken place. As in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 Column 1 in Table 5.3 gives
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the erate before embedding. The erate after embedding had taken place using ICS tools
wbStego4open and SNOW is given in Columns 3 and 4 respectively. From the table it
also can clearly be seen that all erate values increased after embedding had taken place
and there is a wide variation in the range of erate values obtained. A full analysis with
respect to both datasets confirmed this result. A summary of this analysis, with respect
to the ICS seeded WWW pages, is given in Figure 5.3. From the figure it can be seen
that the application of a static erate threshold for detecting ICS, as promoted in Huang
et al.[43], is also not ideal.
Table 5.3: The embedding rate erate of selected webpages before and after embedding
Webpage
erate Dws DSNOW
before embedding erate erate
www.bbc.co.uk 0.091 0.100 0.095
www.bbc.co.uk /weather 0.179 0.224 0.183
www.linkedin.com 0.046 0.138 0.062
www.cnn.com 0.049 0.063 0.053
www.liverpool.ac.uk 0.133 0.217 0.157
www.wikipedia.com 0.055 0.063 0.058
Figure 5.3: Box plots for erate
From the above analysis it is clear that the ICS detection approaches of Sui and Luo
and Huang et al. have disadvantages. The proposed DIC algorithm presented in this
chapter seeks to address these disadvantages.
5.3 Proposed DIC Detection Method
This section presents the proposed DIC detection method. The idea was to use the
frequency distributions of different lengths of sequences of a white space characters as
a mechanism for identifying ICS. To the best knowledge of the author the proposed
DIC ICS detection approach is unlike any other ICS detection approach presented in
the literature. The DIC approach is fully described in this section. However, prior to
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Table 5.4: First ten white space character segment lengths in selected webpages before
and after embedding
Webpage
Before After embedding After embedding
embedding (wbStego4open) (SNOW)
www.bbc.co.uk 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 8 · 1 · 1 2 · 6 · 5 · 3 · 2 · 3 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1
www.dhl.com 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 1 · 3 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 5 · 1 · 1 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 7 · 6 · 7
www.ieee.org 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 5 · 1 · 1 · 1 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 7 · 6 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1
www.google.com 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 2 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 7 · 1 · 1 · 1 6 · 1 · 3 · 3 · 5 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1
www.sdwik.net 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 1 · 1 · 1 · 2 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 6 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 7 · 6 · 7 · 6 · 1 · 1
dailyroutines.typepad.com 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 2 · 1 · 2 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 5 · 1 · 1 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 6 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 3
www.khanacademy.com 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 8 · 1 · 1 4 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 4 · 1 · 1 · 1 7 · 6 · 7 · 6 · 5 · 3 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1
www.sony.com 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 4 · 4 · 4 1 · 3 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 5 · 1 · 1 7 · 6 · 7 · 6 · 5 · 3 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1
commencing the description, it should be noted that the term segment is used throughout
this section to describe contiguous sequences either of white space characters or non-
white space characters. Table 5.4 shows the length of the first ten white space character
segments before and after embedding for a selection of eight webpages from the Non-
Monitoring dataset in Appendix A. The · (dot) symbol used in the table indicates the
presence of character segments other than white space segments. From the table it
can clearly be seen, as expected, that the length of at least some of the white space
segments increases in the presence of ICS. Although some webpages already have space
character segments of length more than 1 before any embedding has taken place (the
Khan Academy and Sony webpages in the table). However, the table clearly indicates
that the idea of using the frequency distribution of different white space segments is
worth exploring.
The frequency distribution of a white space character segment of length l in a web-
page W , fcscsl(W ), can be calculated using Equation 5.4 where l is the segment length.
Note that
∑k
l=1 fcscsl(W ) = 1.0 (where k is the maximum size of the segments featured
in W ).
fcscsl(W ) =
number of segments of length l in W
total number of segments in W
(5.4)
Table 5.5 shows the fcscs5 values, before and after embedding, with respect to some
selected webpages from the Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix A. From the table it
can clearly be seen, as expected, that the frequency distributions of the white space
segments will increase in presence of ICS. This same phenomena was observed with
respect to the remaining webpages (not shown in Table 5.5).
Given the above, the basic idea of using the frequency distribution of white space
segments, within webpages, of different length, with and without embedding, as an
indicator of ICS seems like a good one. More specifically the idea is to build a binary
prediction model (a classifier) generated using a n-dimensional feature space where n
is the number of different potential white space segment lengths of interest that might
be included in a webpage. The value for each dimension would then be the frequency
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Table 5.5: fcscs5 for some sample webpages before and after embedding
Webpage
fcscs5 fcscs5 after fcscs5 after
without embedding embedding
embedding (wbStego4open) (SNOW)
www.cnn.com 0.00000 0.03590 0.03990
www.wikipedia.com 0.00000 0.06870 0.15660
www.bbc.co.uk 0.02250 0.05580 0.06120
www.bbc.co.uk/weather 0.00630 0.03180 0.02560
www.adobe.com 0.00080 0.03360 0.02160
www.cisco.com 0.02310 0.05010 0.04320
www.stackoverflow.com 0.00066 0.02999 0.00880
www.sony.com 0.00170 0.03340 0.01760
www.ipod.com 0.00200 0.04330 0.02870
www.nbc.com 0.02300 0.03500 0.02660
www.amazon.com 0.00110 0.03500 0.01520
www.expedia.com 0.00600 0.03660 0.02400
distribution of the indicated white space segment in the given webpage. In this manner
a webpage would be defined in terms of a feature vector V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}.
The process for generating a set of feature vectors, given a set of webpages D =
{w1, w2, . . . , wm}, with respect to the proposes DIC approach, is given by the pseudo
code presented in Algorithm 6. The input to the algorithm (line 1) is a set of webpages
D and the n the maximum length of white space segment to be considered. Using the
algorithm, for each webpage wi in D, a feature vector Vi of length n is created where
the elements are the frequency distribution of white space sequences of lengths 1 to n.
The process was used to generate sets of feature vectors for evaluation purposes. Note
that for the experimental the Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix A maximum size of
a space character segment was found to be 30, hence n = 30.
Note also that for the training data each feature vector has a class label associated
with it; class 1 represented a stego webpage while class 2 represented a normal webpage.
Algorithm 6: Feature vector generation
1: Input: A set of webpages D = {w1, w2, . . . , wm}, and the maximum size of the
white space segments to be considered n
2: Output: A set of feature vectors Φ = {V1, V2, . . . Vm}
3: Φ = ∅
4: for all wi ∈ D do
5: s = number of white space character segments of length >= 1 in wi
6: for j = 1 to n do
7: t = number of segments in wi of length j
8: Vi[j] =
t
s
9: end for
10: Φ = Φ ∪ Vi
11: end for
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5.4 Evaluation
In this section the evaluation of the proposed DIC ICS detection approach is discussed.
Two sets of experiments were conducted; using the feature vector represented datasets
generated as described above. The first set of experiments was conducted when hidden
messages were seeded using wbStego4open and the second set when hidden messages
were seeded using SNOW. The objectives of the evaluation were as follows:
1. To determine if the proposed detection approach can be effectively applied to
HTML webpage files to detect ICS.
2. To determine the effect of applying a feature selection strategy to the feature vector
representation prior to classifier generation.
3. To determine the effect of the nature of embedded message (English language or
random) and the message length on classifier performance.
4. To determine if the obtained results were statistically significant or not.
5. To provide a comparison between the proposed detection approach and the ap-
proaches to ICS detection of Sui and Lou [68] and Huang et al.[43], as identified
in Section 5.2 above.
The first two of the above objectives are considered in Subsection 5.4.1, while the
third and fourth in Sub-section 5.4.2 and the fifth in Sub-section 5.4.4.
5.4.1 Effectiveness of the proposed detection approach
The effectiveness of the proposed ICS detection technique was measured in terms of
accuracy (Acc.) and AUC. The experiments were conducted using the Non-Monitoring
dataset in Appendix A after embedding a message comprised of 72 natural English
language characters. The embedding process was conducted using both wbStego4open
and SNOW.
Ten Cross Validation TCV was used whereby the dataset was first stratified and
then divided into tenths and ten classifiers generated using different nine tenths and
tested on the remaining tenth. For the feature selection the “CfsubsetEval” attribute
evaluation algorithm, and best first search, as provided in the WEKA machine learning
workbench, was used. The idea behind feature selection, as noted in Chapter 2, is to
select a subset of the dimensions (recall that each dimension represents an attribute)
in the feature space, that are good discriminators of class. The search method used
defines how we search the feature space to identify the best attributes. Note that, unlike
other feature selection mechanisms, CfsubsetEval does not select the k best dimensions
(attributes) but the best performing dimensions according to some threshold. There are
many different techniques that can be used for both.
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Table 5.6: Effectiveness of proposed ICS detection technique using Dws without fea-
ture selection
TCV
MLP SVM NB
Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC
1 93.33 1.00 100.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 100.00 1.00 93.33 0.94 93.33 0.88
3 86.67 0.96 93.33 0.94 73.33 0.65
4 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00
5 93.33 1.00 93.33 0.94 86.67 0.96
6 86.67 0.80 86.67 0.87 86.67 0.88
7 93.33 0.96 100.00 1.00 86.67 0.86
8 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 93.33 1.00
9 86.67 0.86 93.33 0.93 73.33 0.88
10 80.00 0.82 93.33 0.94 86.67 0.95
Average 92.00 0.94 95.33 0.95 88.00 0.90
SD 6.89 0.08 4.50 0.04 9.32 0.11
Table 5.7: Effectiveness of proposed ICS detection technique using DSNOW without
feature selection
TCV
MLP SVM NB
Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC
1 86.67 0.89 86.67 0.88 80.00 0.84
2 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 66.67 0.78
3 80.00 0.88 86.67 0.87 60.00 0.46
4 80.00 0.96 93.33 0.93 93.33 1.00
5 100.00 1.00 93.33 0.93 86.67 0.84
6 93.33 1.00 80.00 0.79 73.33 0.70
7 93.33 0.98 80.00 0.81 66.67 0.63
8 86.67 0.98 80.00 0.81 80.00 0.79
9 80.00 0.84 86.67 0.86 66.67 0.68
10 86.67 0.88 73.33 0.73 60.00 0.68
Average 88.67 0.94 86.00 0.86 73.33 0.74
SD 7.73 0.06 7.98 0.08 11.33 0.15
The results are presented in Tables 5.6 to 5.9 (best results highlighted in bold font).
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the results obtained without feature section, whilst Tables 5.8
and 5.9 the results obtained with feature selection. A summary is presented in Table
5.10. From the summary table it can be seen that better results were obtained when
using feature selection than without feature selection. With respect to the Dws dataset
SVM produced consistently the best accuracy, whilst best AUC was produced using
SVM and NB with feature selection. In the case of the DSNOW dataset best results
were obtained consistently using MLP.
With respect to the feature selection it is interesting to note that the selected values
of l, the length of white space segments with respect to Dws, were {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 21},
the value of 21 seems odd and might simply be an “outlier”. In the case of DSNOW the
selected values for l were {1, 2, 5, 7}.
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Table 5.8: Effectiveness of proposed ICS detection technique using Dws with feature
selection
TCV
MLP SVM NB
Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC
1 93.33 1.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00
2 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 93.33 0.88
3 93.33 0.96 93.33 0.94 93.33 0.96
4 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00
5 93.33 0.98 93.33 0.94 100.00 1.00
6 86.67 0.98 93.33 0.94 93.33 1.00
7 93.33 1.00 100.00 1.00 93.33 1.00
8 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00
9 93.33 0.86 93.33 0.93 93.33 1.00
10 86.67 1.00 93.33 0.94 86.67 0.98
Average 94.00 0.98 96.67 0.97 95.33 0.98
SD 4.92 0.04 3.51 0.03 4.5 0.04
Table 5.9: Effectiveness of proposed ICS detection technique using DSNOW with
feature selection
TCV
MLP SVM NB
Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC
1 93.33 0.89 86.67 0.87 73.33 0.89
2 100.00 1.00 86.67 0.86 73.33 1.00
3 86.67 0.93 80.00 0.79 69.33 0.77
4 100.00 1.00 93.33 0.93 93.33 1.00
5 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00
6 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 80.00 1.00
7 86.67 0.96 73.33 0.75 73.33 1.00
8 100.00 1.00 80.00 0.81 73.33 1.00
9 93.33 0.86 86.67 0.87 86.67 0.86
10 93.33 0.88 93.33 0.94 66.67 0.88
Average 95.33 0.95 88.00 0.88 78.89 0.94
SD 5.49 0.06 8.78 0.08 12.19 0.08
Table 5.10: Summary of results presented in Tables 5.6 to 5.9 (best results highlighted
in bold font)
Data Feature MLP SVM NB
Set Selection Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC
Dws
No 92.00 0.94 95.33 0.95 88.00 0.90
Yes 94.00 0.98 96.67 0.97 95.33 0.98
DSNOW
No 88.67 0.94 86.00 0.86 73.33 0.74
Yes 95.33 0.95 88.00 0.88 78.89 0.94
5.4.2 The effect of Different Message Type and Length Embedding
To investigate the effect of the nature of the hidden message, and its length, on the ICS
detection two sets of experiments were conducted. The first used English language em-
bedded messages while the second random messages (a mixture of uppercase, lowercase
letters and numbers). For both sets of experiments:
• Messages of different lengths were embedded from between 20 to 100 characters,
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incrementing of steps of 20 characters. The length of a hidden message this time
is absolute not relative to the MEC because as mentioned in Appendix A that ICS
tools provide high embedding capacity. A relative increment of a hidden message
length (for example 30%, 40%. . . . , 100%) with respect to the MEC would result
in very long messages that can be easily detected.
• The wbStego4open and SNOW ICS tools were used to embed messages.
• For each message length ten selected (English language and random) messages
were embedded.
• Webpages were represented using a thirty attributes feature vector that containing
the white space character segment frequency distributions. These feature vectors
were the inputs to the classifiers (with class labels for training).
• Two performance metrics were recorded: (i) Accuracy (Acc) and (ii) Area Under
Curve (AUC).
• Three classification models were used: (i) MLP (ii) SVM and (iii) NB.
As a consequence of the above twenty datasets were generated in total using wb-
Stego4open ICS tool grouped into four categories: (i) webstegoNatural1, (ii) webstego-
Natural2, (iii) webstegoRandom1 and (iv) webstegoRandom2. Categories webstegoNat-
ural1 and webstegoNatural2 comprised English language message embedding datasets
generated using wbStego4open with and without feature selection respectively; whilst
categories webstegoRandom1 and webstegoRandom2 comprised random message em-
bedding datasets generated using wbStego4open with and without feature selection re-
spectively. Each category comprised five datasets, each including messages of a different
length. The same four categories are generated this time using SNOW ICS tool.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 present the results obtained using AUC metric. The results showed
that the nature of the embedded messages (natural English language or random) has
no differential effect on the performance of the proposed DIC ICS detection approach.
However, the length of the embedded message did influence the performance of the
classifiers where wbStego4open ICS has been used for messages hiding. This influence is
clearer with respect to the recorded performance of the MLP and NB classifiers than in
the case of the SVM classifier. From the figures it can also be noted that when feature
selection is applied this improved the performance of the MLP and NB classifiers than
in the case of the SVM classifier. With respect where SNOW ICS has been used for
messages hiding it can be noted that from Figure 5.5 the recorded performance of the
MLP is better than in the case of the SVM and NB classifiers. The reason behind this
is that MLP classifier can support different data types and learn the important features
from any data structure.
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Figure 5.4: Operation of proposed DIC ICS detection approach using wbStego4open.
Left: English language messages embedding. Right: Random text embedding.
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Figure 5.5: Operation of proposed DIC ICS detection approach using SNOW. Left:
English language messages embedding. Right: Random text embedding.
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5.4.3 Statistical Evaluation
To determine whether the obtained results presented in Figures 5.4 to 5.5, using wb-
Stego4open and SNOW, were indeed statistically significant and not simply a matter of
chance the Friedman Test was conducted (in similar manner to that described in Chap-
ter 4). The AUC values obtained with respect to the above reported experiments were
used for this purpose. The outcomes are presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, respectively.
Table 5.11: Friedman test results using AUC values for wbStego4open message em-
bedding
Main Sub-Data Feature Embedded MLP SVM NB Chi-Sequare p-value
Datasets Sets Selection Messages AUC
9.579 0.008
webstegoNatural1
Dws20
No Natural English Text
0.87 0.67 0.63
Dws40 0.80 0.62 0.62
Dws60 0.89 0.71 0.64
Dws80 0.91 0.81 0.69
Dws100 0.91 0.81 0.70
Average Rank 0.87 0.72 0.65
webstegoNatural2
Dws20
Yes Natural English Text
0.89 0.62 0.87
8.444 0.015
Dws40 0.91 0.68 0.89
Dws60 0.92 0.69 0.92
Dws80 0.92 0.72 0.93
Dws100 0.94 0.77 0.94
Average Rank 0.92 0.69 0.91
webstegoRandom1
Dws20
No Random Text
0.72 0.63 0.61
9.579 0.008
Dws40 0.78 0.63 0.63
Dws60 0.83 0.69 0.61
Dws80 0.86 0.76 0.68
Dws100 0.88 0.80 0.69
Average Rank 0.81 0.70 0.64
webstegoRandom2
Dws20
Yes Random Text
0.77 0.61 0.54
8.400 0.015
Dws40 0.90 0.60 0.75
Dws60 0.91 0.64 0.88
Dws80 0.93 0.66 0.90
Dws100 0.93 0.71 0.92
Average Rank 0.88 0.64 0.79
In Tables 5.11 and 5.12 Column 1 lists the the dataset category as mentioned in
previous section, whilst Column 2 lists the 5 datasets (each featuring a different embed-
ded message length) included in each category. Column 3 indicates if feature selection
was been applied or not. The nature of the embedded message is shown in Column 4.
The AUC values associated with the MLP, SVM and NB classification models are given
next. The values in Columns 8 and 9 give the Chi-Square Friedman test statistics and
the associated p-value.
From Table 5.11 it can be seen that in the case of wbStego4open all the obtained
p-values are less than the significance level of α = 0.05, therefore the null-hypothesis
H0 can be rejected. It can also be noted from Table 5.11 that regardless of whether
feature selection was applied or not, the best performance was obtained using MLP
classification. Since as mentioned that H0 can be rejected accordingly the Nemenyi test
was conducted using the same parameters (K, N and q) as in the previous chapter. The
Critical Difference (CD) was again = 1.4 (as in the previous chapter). Figure 5.6 presents
a visualization of the Nemenyi test for results in Table 5.11 for both cases with/without
feature selection. The figure lists again each classification model along with its CD
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Figure 5.6: Visualization of Nemenyi test for results given in Table 5.11 (a): no
feature selection is applied (b): feature selection is applied
value. When no feature selection was applied MLP performance was significant only
with respect to NB (the CD tails do not overlap). When feature selection was applied
MLP classifier performance was significant only with respect to SVM classification.
With respect to the SNOW ICS message embedding tool Table 5.12 presents the
Friedman test results. From the table it can be seen that p−value < α = 0.05, therefore
the null-hypothesis (H0) can be rejected and the Nemenyi test was applied. The same
CD value of 1.4 was used. A visualization of Nemenyi test for results in Table 5.12 is
presented in Figure 5.7. From the figure it can be observed that the best performance
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with/without applying feature selection was obtained using MLP classifier and this was
only significant for SVM classifier (the CD tails do not overlap).
Table 5.12: Friedman test results using AUC values for SNOW of natural and random
message embedding with and without feature selection
Main Sub-Data Feature Embedded MLP SVM NB Chi-Sequare p-value
Datasets Sets Selection Messages AUC
10.000 0.007
snowNatural1
DSnow20
No Natural English Text
0.75 0.65 0.69
DSnow40 0.77 0.66 0.68
DSnow60 0.76 0.65 0.66
DSnow80 0.78 0.65 0.68
DSnow100 0.76 0.67 0.69
Average Rank 0.76 0.65 0.68
snowNatural2
DSnow20
Yes Natural English Text
0.82 0.61 0.73
10.000 0.007
DSnow40 0.82 0.65 0.71
DSnow60 0.81 0.65 0.71
DSnow80 0.88 0.68 0.75
DSnow100 0.88 0.61 0.67
Average Rank 0.84 0.64 0.71
snowRandom1
DSnow20
No Random Text
0.79 0.66 0.69
10.000 0.007
DSnow40 0.79 0.67 0.69
DSnow60 0.77 0.64 0.69
DSnow80 0.76 0.66 0.69
DSnow100 0.77 0.66 0.69
Average Rank 0.77 0.65 0.69
snowRandom2
DSnow20
Yes Random Text
0.88 0.68 0.76
10.000 0.007
DSnow40 0.88 0.61 0.73
DSnow60 0.88 0.68 0.76
DSnow80 0.87 0.65 0.70
DSnow100 0.87 0.68 0.75
Average Rank 0.86 0.66 0.74
5.4.4 Comparison with other detection approaches
For the fifth and final objective, comparison with existing techniques, the comparison
was conducted with respect to the performance of the approaches of Sui and Luo [68] and
Huang et al.[43] (both previously described in Section 5.2). So that a fair comparison
could be arrived at the evaluation was again conducted using TCV, although it should
be noted that the approaches proposed by Sui and Lou and Huang et al. are both
statistical in nature and do not require any training. The intuition here was that the
evaluation would provide an unfair advantage to the proposed DIC system if it were
trained on the entire dataset and then tested on the same dataset (it might also result in
“overfitting”). For comparison both SVM and MLP classification with feature selection
were used with respect to the proposed method, as these had been shown to produce
the best performance. For both detection approaches the reported threshold values were
adopted. The evaluation metrics used were again accuracy and AUC.
The results are presented in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. Note that the accuracy values
for the proposed approach have been reproduced from Tables 5.8 and 5.9 respectively.
From the tables it can clearly be seen that the proposed approach outperformed the
previously proposed approaches by a significant margin. The proposed approach was
good at identifying ICS webpages while at the same time using both approaches Sui and
Luo and Huang et al. was poor. Given that the ICS and non-ICS classes were equally
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Figure 5.7: Visualization of Nemenyi test for results given in Table 5.12
distributed within the dataset the accuracies obtained using Sui and Luo, and Huang,
with message embedding using wbStego4open was 54.69% and 50.01% respectively, in
other words little better than a guess. In the case of message embedding using SNOW
accuracies of 51.00% and 46.00% were obtained, the last one worse than random guess-
ing. IN both cases of detection Sui and Luo, and Huang the average AUC was 0.2.
Table 5.13: Comparison of proposed DIC approach to ICS compared with Sui and
Luo, and Huang, using wbStego4open message embedding (best results highlighted on
bold font)
TCV
DIC Approach Sui and Luo Huang et al.
Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC
1 100.00 1.00 53.00 0.54 53.33 0.56
2 100.00 1.00 60.00 0.58 60.00 0.63
3 93.33 0.94 53.33 0.52 33.33 0.36
4 100.00 1.00 60.00 0.57 53.33 0.56
5 93.33 0.94 40.00 0.38 47.00 0.50
6 93.00 0.94 47.00 0.47 73.00 0.75
7 100.00 1.00 47.00 0.47 33.33 0.38
8 100.00 1.00 60.00 0.59 53.33 0.56
9 93.33 0.93 53.33 0.53 47.00 0.50
10 100.00 0.94 73.33 0.73 47.00 0.50
Average 96.67 0.97 54.69 0.54 50.01 0.53
SD 3.51 0.03 8.79 0.08 11.16 0.11
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Table 5.14: Comparison of proposed DIC approach to ICS detection with Sui and
Luo, and Huang et al., using SNOW message embedding (best results highlighted on
bold font)
TCV
DIC Approach Sui and Luo Huang et al.
Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC Acc.% AUC
1 93.33 0.89 46.67 0.46 46.67 0.49
2 100.00 1.00 53.33 0.51 60.00 0.63
3 86.67 0.93 53.33 0.52 33.33 0.36
4 100.00 1.00 60.00 0.57 53.33 0.56
5 100.00 1.00 40.00 0.38 40.00 0.34
6 100.00 1.00 40.00 0.40 73.33 0.75
7 86.67 0.96 46.67 0.45 26.67 0.29
8 100.00 1.00 60.00 0.59 53.33 0.56
9 93.33 0.86 46.67 0.46 40.00 0.43
10 93.33 0.88 66.67 0.66 46.67 0.50
Average 95.33 0.95 51.00 0.50 47.00 0.49
SD 5.49 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13
5.5 Summary
In this chapter the proposed DIC approach for ICS detection has been presented. The
fundamental idea of the approach was founded on the observation that the length of
white space segments in webpages increases in the presence of ICS, and that this infor-
mation can be captured in a feature vector format and subsequently used to build an
ICS prediction (classification) model provided available pre-labeled training data. To
evaluate the proposed mechanism the Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix A is used.
This was split into two, half seeded with an embedded messages and half not. In this
manner two 150 webpage test datasets were created, one using the wbStego4open ICS
tool and one using the SNOW ICS tool. The proposed approach was tested using three
well known classifier generation models and with and without feature selection. A best
average accuracy of 96.7% was obtained indicating the effectiveness of the proposed
approach compared with the previously proposed approaches of Sui and Luo [68], and
Huang et al. [43]. In the next chapter the proposed TV approach is presented which
was designed to address Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography (TLCSS) detection.
Chapter 6
Tag Letters Case Switching
Detection Using Tag Variance
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter the Tag Variance (TV) mechanism for detecting Tag Letters Case Switch-
ing Steganography (TLCSS) is presented. Recall that the fundamental idea of TLCSS
(see Chapter 2) is to switch the case of tag letters from upper to lower case and vice
versa so as to hide messages. Recall also that the switching has no effect on the way
that a webpage is rendered by a browser; so an ideal steganography method.
The proposed TV approach operates by comparing the tag letters case variance
between the current tag letter cases and the situations where some of the tag letters are
switched to either to upper case or to lower case. The idea being to simulate TLCSS
embedding. If as result the “smoothness” of the tag decreases TLCSS is considered to
have existed. The proposed approach is an alternative to the Tag Offset approach to
TLCSS detection proposed by Huang et al. [44] as also described in Chapter 2. The
mechanism of Huang uses an aggregate distance measure, the Tag Offset. However,
using this approach the identification of short messages becomes challenging because
their presence is not readily highlighted using the Tag Offset measure. Part of the
motivation underpinning the proposed TV approach presented in this chapter was thus
to address the detectection short messages embedded using TLCSS. The motivation was
also to try to identify a TLCSS detection mechanism that produced better overall results
than the Tag Offset mechanism.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the pro-
posed TV approach to detecting TLCSS. Calculation of the Maximum Embedding Ca-
pacity (MEC) when using TLCSS is presented in Section 6.3 before considering the
evaluation of the proposed approach in Section 6.4. The evaluation was conducted by
comparing the operation of the proposed TV approach with the Tag Offset approach
using the TLCSS embedding mechanisms of Sui and Luo [87] and Shen Y. [96] (discussed
previously in Chapter 2). Recall that Sui and Luo utilized all tag letters for embedding
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a message while Shen Y used only the first letter. The chapter is concluded with a brief
summary presented in Section 6.5.
6.2 Identification of TLCSS using Tag Variance
This section presents the proposed TV approach to HTML TLCSS detection. As noted
in the introduction to this chapter the TV approach operates using a measure of the
change in distribution (spread) of upper case and lower case letters in a tag, a measure
referred to as the Tag Variance. The process of calculating Tag Variance, in contrast to
the Tag Offset measure proposed by Huang, is presented in Sub-section 6.2.1.
The calculated Tag Variances are then used to calculate a set of statistics, referred
to as the Regular Singular (RS) statistics. The same mechanism was used by Huang et
al. (who in turn took the idea from work on image steganography presented in [35]).
The mechanism was briefly described in Chapter 2; however, because of its significance
with respect to the work presented in this chapter, the process for generating the RS
statistics is described in more detail here.
The RS statistics are a set of four measures, {|RM+|, |RM−|, |SM+|, |SM−|}, where
RM+, RM−, SM+ and SM− are sets of tags {T1, T2, . . . }. The sets of tags are generated
using what is referred to as positive flipping and negative flipping. The difference between
the proposed Tag Variance and the Tag Offset measures is given in Sub-section 6.2.1.
The concept of flipping is discussed in further detail in Sub-section 6.2.2. The generation
of the final RS statistics is then discussed in Subsection 6.2.3. To summarize the work
presented in this section the entire TV process is enumerated in Sub-section 6.2.4
Before continuing with the remainder of the section it should be noted that through-
out the section we defined the letters in a tag using a list T = x1, x2, . . . , xn where xi is
the ASCII code for the letter at position i in the tag and n is the total number of letters
in the given tag.
6.2.1 Tag Variance versus Tag Offset
This section presents further detail concerning the calculation of Tag Variance. Before
providing any further detail it should be noted that both Tag Variance and Tag Offset are
designed to be measures describing the homogeneity or smoothness (the term dispersion
is also sometimes used) of a set of tag letters T ; the mix of uppercase and lower case
letters represented in T . In the case of Huang Tag Offset was calculated as follows:
Tag Offset(T ) =
n−1∑
i=1
|xi+1 − xi| (6.1)
Thus a low Tag Offset value will indicate a smooth (homogeneous) tag, while a high offset
will indicate the reverse. Note that the Tag Offset measure is a simple distance measure,
which does not take into consideration the “spread” from the average ambient value.
Chapter 6. Tag Letters Case Switching Detection Using Tag Variance 85
The proposed Tag Variance measure takes this into consideration and is calculated as
follows:
Tag V ariance(T ) =
∑n
i=1 (xi − µ)2
n
(6.2)
Where: µ is the mean of the values in T = x1, x2, . . . , xn. Thus tag variance takes into
consideration the spread of uppercase and lowercase letters with respect to the average.
As in the case of Tag Offset a low Tag Variance value will indicate a smooth tag and a
high value a non-smooth tag.
6.2.2 Flipping Functions and Masks
Both the proposed TV approach and Huang’s approach use the concept of flipping
functions. Two types flipping are considered: (i) positive flipping using a function
f+1(Ti) and (ii) negative flipping using a function f−1(Ti). In the case of positive flipping
selected lower case letters in a tag Ti are switched to upper case letters; in the case of
negative flipping selected upper case letters in a tag Ti are switched to lower case letters.
A further “flipping” function used is the f0(Ti) function which does not do any letter
case changing (flipping without flipping!). To decide which letters to flip the concept
of a mask is used. A mask in this context is a vector, of length equal to the input tag
length n, with each element corresponding to a letter in the input tag Ti.
The values for the elements in a mask are set according to which flipping function is
to be applied. In case of f+1(Ti) a positive mask M+ is generated with the elements set
to 0 where there is to be no change, and 1 where a lower case letter is to be switched to
an upper case letter. In the case of f−1(Ti) a negative mask M− is generated with the
elements set to 0 if there is to be no change, and −1 where an upper case letter is to be
switched to a lower case letter. Note that for TLCSS detection the locations of 1 and −1
values in both the M+ and M− masks are the same. In the case of the f0 function the
mask represents that current case distribution in the tag. The output from a flipping
function is an altered tag, T ′i , that will be the input to the Tag Variance calculation (as
described above).
6.2.3 Calculation of RS statistics
The Tag Variance of the tags in a webpage to be tested in their current form and once
they have been altered are used to determine the RS statistics. The RS statistics are
calculated by generating sets of tags using both positive and negative flipping, and
predefined masks M+ and M−, as described above. In the case of positive flipping
three sets of tags are produced {RM+, SM+, UM+} (Regular, Singular and Unchanged),
generated as follows:
1. Regular tags RM+ = {T1, T2, . . . }, the set of tags where the tag variance after
flipping is greater than the tag variance before flipping.
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RM+ =
{T (x1, x2...., xn)|TagV ariance(T ′M (x1, x2, ...., xn)) > TagV ariance(T (x1, x2, ...., xn))}.
2. Singular tags SM+ = {T1, T2, . . . }, the set of tags where the tag variance after
flipping is less than the tag variance before flipping.
SM+ =
{T (x1, x2, ...., xn)|TagV ariance(T ′M (x1, x2, ...., xn)) < TagV ariance(T (x1, x2, ...., xn))}.
3. Unchanged UM+ = {T1, T2, . . . }, the set of tags where the tag variance before and
after flipping are equal.
UM+ =
{T (x1, x2, ...., xn)|TagV ariance(T ′M (x1, x2, ...., xn)) = TagV ariance(T (x1, x2, ...., xn))}.
In the case of negative flipping we have the sets of tags {RM−, SM−, UM−} defined in a
similar manner as above.
Once the sets have been determined we calculate the R and S statistics. These are the
lengths of the sets RM+, RM−, SM+ and SM− (the sets UM+ and UM− are generated for
completeness); thus |RM+|, |RM−|, |SM+| and |SM−|. Note that |RM+|+|SM+|+|UM+|m = 1
(where m is the total number of tags). Similarly
|RM−|+|SM−|+|UM−|
m = 1.
The operation of the RS statistic can be illustrated by considering the following. Firstly
considering examples where TLCSS is not present:
• If a webpage features all lowercase tag letters then |RM+| > 0 and —SM+| =
|SM−| = |RM−| = 0
• If a webpage features all uppercase tag letters then |RM−| > 0 and |SM−| =
|SM+| = |RM+| = 0.
However, when TLCSS does exist:
• If a webpage features all lowercase tag letters then |RM+| > |SM+|, |SM+| > 0
and |SM−| > |RM−|, |SM−| > 0, —RM−| > 0.
• If a webpage features all uppercase tag letters then |RM−| > |SM−|, |SM−| > 0
and |SM+| > |RM+|, |SM+| > 0, |RM+| > 0.
• When the length of a hidden message is 100% of the TLCSS Maximum Embedding
Capacity (MEC) of a webpage (see Section 6.3 below) |SM+| > |RM+|, |SM−| >
|RM−| and |SM+| > 0, |SM−| > 0 and |SM+| ≈ |SM−|, |RM+| ≈ |RM−|, |RM+| >
0, |RM−| > 0.
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6.2.4 The Tag Variance Algorithm
In this section the proposed TV algorithm for TLCSS detection is presented. The
algorithm is similar to that presented in Huang et al. [44] with the distinction that Tag
Variance is used instead of Tag Offset. The process is as follows:
1. Collect all tags in a webpage in set Q1 and compute the Tag Variance using
Equation 6.2.
2. Apply positive flipping to all tags in Q1 using f+1(T ) and f0(T ) with a mask M+
so that altered tags are obtained and saved in the set Q2.
3. Compute Tag Variance of the altered tags in Q2
4. Determine RM+ and SM+.
5. Apply negative flipping to all tags in Q1 using f−1(T ) and f0(T ) with mask M−
so that altered tags are again obtained and saved them in Q3 set.
6. Compute Tag Variance of the altered tags in Q3
7. Determine RM− and SM−.
8. Examine the relationship between RM+, SM+, RM−, SM− statistics to decide
whether a webpage is normal or stego.
6.3 Maximum Embedding Capacity Using TLCSS
Using TLCSS the maximum size of a message that could be held in a webpage depends
on the TLCSS algorithm used. Two TLCSS algorithms were considered with respect to
the work presented in this chapter: (i) Sui and Luo [87] and (ii) Shen Y. [96]. In Sui
and Luo all tag letters were used for the purpose of message hiding while in Shen Y.
only the first letter of each tag was used. Thus, in the case of Sui and Luo the MEC, in
bytes, is calculated as follows:
MECSui and Luo =
∑m
i=1 |Ti|
8
(6.3)
Where |Ti| is the length (number of letters) in tag Ti and m is the number of tags in
the given webpage. Division by 8 so the result is given in bytes. With respect to Shen
Y. the MEC is then calculated as follows:
MECShen Y. =
m
8
(6.4)
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6.4 Evaluation
In this section the results obtained from the evaluation of the proposed TV TLCSS
detection approach is presented. Four sets of experiments were conducted; the objectives
of which were as follows:
1. To analyze the behavior of the RS statistics given hidden messages of different
lengths.
2. To determine the effect of applying different masks M on the TLCSS detection.
3. To provide a comparison between the proposed TV approach and Tag Offset ap-
proach of Huang et al. with respect to both natural English language and random
message embedding.
4. To determine whether the results obtained with respect to the experiments con-
ducted to address the previous objective are statistically significant or not.
These objectives are considered in turn in Sub-sections 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4
respectively. Note that for all the evaluation objectives the Non-Monitoring dataset in
Appendix Awas used. Two metrics were used for the evaluation:
• The True Positive rate (TP) , the percentage of correctly detected stego webpages
with respect to the total number of webpages considered.
• The False Negatives (FN) rate, the percentage of stego webpages identified as
non-stego webpages with respect to the total number of webpages considered.
It should be noted that the higher the TP rate the lower the FN and vice versa.
6.4.1 Behavior of The RS Statistics Given Hidden Message of Different
Length
With respect to the first of the above evaluation objectives, to analyze the behavior of the
RS Statistics given hidden message of different length, the experimentation comprised
two individual experiments as follows:
• A set of experiments using a single webpage from the TV dataset, the Wikipedia
landing page, repeatedly seeded with English language hidden messages of increas-
ing size, from 10% to 100% of the MEC, incrementing in steps of 10%.
• A set of experiments using thirty webpages from the TV dataset each seeded with
an English language hidden message of length equivalent to 100% of the MEC for
each webpage.
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In both cases Sui and Luo’s TLCSS embedding method was used. The proposed TV
approach was then applied and the obtained RS statistics recorded. The masks used
were: M+ = [1, 1, 1] for positive flipping and M− = [−1,−1,−1] for negative flipping.
The results are presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
From Figure 6.1 it can be seen how the RS statistics increase/decrease in a more or
less linear manner as the relative size of the hidden message increases. Both SM+ and
SM− increase significantly, while in the case of RM− the increase is less significant. The
RM− statistic decreases as the size of the message decreases. These results confirm the
expected outcomes identified in Sub-section 6.2.3 .
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Figure 6.1: Effect of incremental increases in the hidden message size on the RS
Statistics (RM+, SM+, RM− and SM−)
In Figure 6.2 the X-axis; lists the ID number for the selected webpages, while the
Y-axis gives the RS values (RM+, SM+, RM− and SM−). From the figure the following
can be observed: (i) SM+ and SM− closely approximate each other, (ii) RM+ and RM−
also approximate each other (but less closely) and SM+ and SM− are greater that RM+
and RM−. These results again confirm the expected outcomes identified in Sub-section
6.2.3.
6.4.2 The Effect of Masking
Recall from Section 6.2 that the RS statistics are calculated as a consequence of applying
flipping functions to the letters featured in tags and that the nature of this flipping is
dictated by a mask. Recall also that we apply both positive and negative flipping (upper
case to lower case, and vice versa) using positive and negative masks (M+ and M−)
respectively. Thus the effectiveness of the proposed TLCSS detection approach was
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Figure 6.2: RS statistics generated using the TV approach when hidden messages (of
length equivalent to 100% of MEC) are embedded in selected webpages from the TV
dataset
dependent on the nature of the masks. A second set of experiments was thus conducted
to evaluate the usage of different masks on TLCSS detection.
For the experiments half of the webpages in the TV dataset were seeded with different
English Language messages, again using Sui and Luo’s TLCSS algorithm. The length of
the seeded messages varied between 2% and 10% of MEC, incrementing in steps of 2%.
The reason for using relatively short hidden messages was that the approach of Huang
et al. had founded these to be particularly challenging. A range of different masks were
used:
• For positive flipping:
M+ = {[1, 0, 1, 1], [1, 0, 1, 0], [1, 1, 1], [0, 1, 1], [1, 1, 0], [1, 0, 0], [0, 0, 1] and [0, 1, 0]}.
• For negative flipping:
M− = {[−1, 0,−1,−1], [−1, 0,−1, 0], [−1,−1,−1], [0,−1,−1], [−1,−1, 0], [−1, 0, 0],
[0, 0,−1] and [0,−1, 0]}.
In each case the TV algorithm was applied and the TP and FN rates were recorded.
Figure 6.3 shows the results obtained when using two of the above masks; M+ =
[1, 0, 1, 1] , M− = [−1, 0,−1,−1] and M+ = [1, 0, 1, 0], M− = [−1, 0,−1, 0]. The graph
on the top considers the TP rate, and that on the bottom the FN rate. In the figure
the X-axis represents length of the hidden messages, while the Y-axis represents either
the True Positives (TP) or False Negatives rate (FN). From the figure it can be seen
that the (TP) rate of 96% was attained with respect to hidden messages of a length of
2% of the MEC when using masks M+ = [1, 0, 1, 1] and M− = [−1, 0,−1,−1]. While
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when using masks M+ = [1, 0, 1, 0] and M− = [−1, 0,−1, 0], many stego webpages
were missed. This is consequently reflected on the recorded FN rate values. Using
masks M+ = [1, 0, 1, 1] and M− = [−1, 0,−1,−1] resulted that the FN rate was much
lower than when using masks M+ = [1, 0, 1, 0] and M− = [−1, 0,−1, 0]. From this set of
experiments it was concluded that the most appropriate masks to use were M+=[1,0,1,1]
and M−=[-1,0,-1,-1].
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Figure 6.3: Illustration of the use of different masks for TLCSS detection using the
proposed TV approach; top: TP rate, bottom: FN rate
6.4.3 Comparisons with Other Detection Approaches
For the comparison with other TLCSS detection approach the operation of the proposed
TV approach was compared to the Tag Offset approach of Huang et al. as presented
in [44]. The TLCSS embedding mechanisms of both Sui and Luo [87] and Shen Y. [96]
were used together with the Non-Monitoring dataset in Appendix A also used for earlier
experiments. The dataset was half seeded with hidden messages using one or other of
the selected TLCSS mechanisms. The comparisons were conducted firstly using natural
English language message embedding, and secondly using random message embedding.
Recall that when using Sui and Luo all the tag letters are used, while when using
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Shen Y. only the first letter of each tag are used. The MEC calculation for each is
therefore different as discussed in Section 6.3. For the experiments the masks were
used M+=[1,0,1,1] and M−=[-1,0,-1,-1] because earlier experiments, reported in the
foregoing subsection, has indicated that these masks worked well. In the case of Sui
and Luo the message lengths ranged from 2% to 6%, increasing in steps of 2%, with
respect to the relevant MEC. In the case of Shen Y. the lengths ranged from 4% to 14%
incrementing in steps of 2%.
This distinction was because experiments conducted earlier had indicated that pro-
posed Tag Variance could detect Sui and Luo TLCSS embedding, even when very short
hidden messages were used. In the case of detecting Shen Y. TLCSS embedding, ex-
periments conducted had indicated that the proposed Tag Variance operated best with
longer hidden messages (although still relatively short).
The results obtained are given in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. Figure 6.4 shows the results
obtained using Sui and Luo embedding, (a) natural English language messages and (b)
random messages. The X-axis in each case represents the hidden message length relative
to the MEC, while the Y-axis represents either: TP rate (left); or FN rate (right). From
the figure it can be noted that the performance of the TV proposed approach is better
than the performance of Huangs Tag Offset approach. In some cases the proposed TV
approach identified all of the stego webpages, a detection rate of 100% whereas the Tag
Offset approach did not. As a consequence the FN rate (missing stego webpages) in
the case of using proposed TV approach was much less than in the case of Huangs Tag
Offset approach. From the figure it can also be noted that the nature of the message
embedding made little difference with respect to TLCSS detection.
Figure 6.5 in turn shows the results obtained using Shen Y. From the figure it
can be seen that both approaches achieved a similar performance. An approximate
detection rate of 90% was achieved by both detection approaches with respect to hidden
messages of length 14% of the webpage MEC. webpages featuring shorter messages were
undetected, hence the high FN rate. Again the nature of message embedding made little
difference with respect to TLCSS detection.
6.4.4 Statistical Evaluation
This sub-section reports on the results of the statistical significance testing conducted
with respect to the results reported on in the previous sub-section. The aim of the signif-
icance testing was to answer the question whether the performance of the Tag Variance
approach compared to the performance of the Tag Offset is statistically significant or
simply a matter of chance. The test used was the Wilcoxon signed-rank test [23] because
only two True Positives (TP) rate samples, that of Tag Variance and Tag Offset, were
collected. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric test used to compare two
related samples, matched samples or repeated measurements on a single sample. It is
an alternative to the paired t-test and is typically used to test the differences in the
mean of paired observations. These differences are ranked to produce two rank totals
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Figure 6.4: Comparison between the proposed Tag Variance approach and the Tag
Offset approach using Sui and Luo TLCSS embedding
(positive and negative) that are used later to find test statistics Appendix B. Under the
null hypothesis, H0, these two totals are the same. Since the results, presented above,
indicated that the nature of the embedded message has no effect on the True Positives
rate (TP) only the results of obtained using natural English language messages embed-
ding from Figures 6.4 and 6.5 were used. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 present the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test results obtained using Sui and Luo and Shen Y embedding respectively.
In Figure 6.6 it can be seen that the test statistics were z = −1.342 and p = 0.18, and
in Figure 6.7 that the test statistics were z = 0 and p = 1.000 . Since p for both tests is
greater than 0.05 (the significant level) it can be concluded that there is no statistical
difference in operation between the proposed TV approach and the Tag Offset approach;
in other words the null-hypothesis H0 is accepted.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter the proposed Tag Variance (TV) approach to detecting TLCSS has been
presented. The idea is founded on the Tag Offset approach proposed in Huang et al.
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Figure 6.5: Comparison between the proposed Tag Variance approach and the Tag
Offset approach using Shen Y. TLCSS embedding
 
Figure 6.6: Results of Wilcoxon test comparing statistical significance of the TV and
Tag Offset approaches using Sui and Luo TLCSS embedding
[44]. The reported evaluation demonstrated that the proposed Tag Variance mechanism,
when coupled with appropriate positive and negative masks, outperformed the TLCSS
detection approach of Huang et al., especially with respect to detection of Sui and Luo
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Figure 6.7: Results of Wilcoxon test comparing statistical significance of the TV and
Tag Offset approaches using Shen Y. TLCSS embedding
TLCSS embedding of short hidden messages (2% of a webpage’s MEC). Even though
the reported results showed that TV performed better than the Tag Offset approach,
the results were not found to be statistical significance using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test. The next chapter concludes this thesis with a summary of the contributions and
main findings, and some suggestions for future research directions.

Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a summary of the work presented in this thesis, a review of the
main findings in the context of the research question and research issues identified in
Chapter 1 and some suggestions for fruitful the future work directions.
7.2 Summary
In this thesis a set of HTML steganography detection methods have been proposed
directed at three different kinds of HTML steganography methods: (i) Attribute Per-
mutation Steganography (APS), (ii) Invisible Character Steganography (ICS) and (iii)
Tag Letters Case Switching Steganography (TLCSS). In total four algorithms were pro-
posed: (i) Statistical Detection (SD) (ii) Attribute Position Changes Count (APCC) (iii)
Detect Invisible Character (DIC) and (iv) Tag Variance (TV). The first two directed at
APS, and the third and fourth directed at ICS and TLCSS, respectively. A distinction
was also made between steganography monitoring in relation to dynamic context and
steganography detection in relation to static context.
The thesis commenced, in Chapter 2 with a literature review of previous work rele-
vant to the work presented in the thesis. The following four chapters covered the pro-
posed HTML steganography detection approaches, each directed at a specific approach
(as listed above). These chapters were all structured in a similar manner starting with
a description of the proposed approach and ending with a review of the evaluation con-
ducted with respect to each approach. All the proposed approaches were tested using
both natural English language and random embedded messages.
In more detail Chapter 3 presented the SD approach designed to detect APS in the
dynamic monitoring context. The fundamental idea was to use the standard deviation
of the change in tag attribute position as a measure for detecting the presence (or
otherwise) of APS. The proposed detection was tested with respect to the APS methods
of: Deogol [80], Huang et al.[45] and Shen et al.[81]. A mechanism whereby the SD
threshold σ value for a particular WWW page could be learnt was also given.
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Chapter 4 considered the proposed APCC approach to detecting APS in the non-
monitoring context. In this proposed approach the concept of the attribute position
changes count was used to detect the presence of steganography. Unlike in the case
of the proposed SD approach the steganography detection (steganalysis) problem was
formulated as a supervised learning problem. For the presented evaluation three clas-
sification models were used: (i) Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) Neural Network, (ii)
Support Vectors Machine (SVM) and (iii) Naive Bayes(NB). Classifiers performance
was evaluated in terms of: (i) Accuracy and (ii) Area Under the Receiver Operator
Characteristic Curve (AUC). The evaluation included an investigation of whether the
results were statistically significant or not by applying the Freidman Test. As in the case
of the SD approach the APCC approach was tested using the APS embedding methods
of Deogol, Huang et al. and Shen et al. The operation of the APCC approach was
compared with the approaches of L.Polak and Z.Kotulski [65] (dynamic context) and
W.Jian-feng et al. [95] (static context) and the SD approach from the previous chap-
ter. The evaluation results indicated the followings: (i) the APCC approach was more
efficient than the approach of W.Jian-feng et al (ii) the SD approach produced better
results than that of L.Polak and Z.Kotulski in the non-monitoring context.
Chapter 5 considered the DIC approach directed at detecting ICS in the non-monitoring
context. The fundamental idea was to use the frequency distribution of continuous se-
quences (segments) of a white space character to distinguish normal webpages from stego
webpages. An idea founded on the observation that the frequency of space character
segments will change when inserting additional white space characters to embed mes-
sages. Two freely available tools, SNOW [60] and wbStego4open [91], were used for the
purpose of embedding hidden messages using ICS. Again a supervised learning approach
was adopted, and for the evaluation the same classification models as considered previ-
ously with respect to the work presented in Chapter 4 were considered. The operation of
the proposed DIC approach was compared with the ICS detection approaches of Sui and
Luo [68] and Huang et al. [43]. The results demonstrated a significantly better detection
rate with respect to the DIC approach over the other two considered approaches. The
statistical significance of the results was also reported on.
Chapter 6 considered the proposed TV approach directed at the detection of TLCSS,
again, in the non-monitoring context. The idea was to use a measure of tag letters case
“smoothness” called Tag Variance, an improved version of the Tag offset mechanism of
Huang et al. [44]. For the evaluation the TLCSS embedding mechanisms of Sui and
Luo [87] and (ii) Shen Y. [96] were considered. The evaluation outcomes indicated that
the TV mechanism performed better than the TLCSS detection approach of Huang et
al., especially with respect to short hidden messages. The evaluation included an in-
vestigation of whether the results were statistically significant or not by applying the
Wilcoxon-signed rank test.
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7.3 Main Findings and Contributions
This section presents the main findings resulting from the research presented in this
thesis. Recall that the original research question from Chapter 1 was “What are the
most appropriate detection approaches, dynamic and static, required to efficiently and
effectively detect hidden messages in HTML files?”. In Chapter 1 a number of subsidiary
questions were also postulated. Each of these will be considered in turn, before returning
the main overriding research question, as follows:
1. “What are the features of steganography that can best be adopted to facilitate de-
tection?”. The answer to this is that is depends on which HTML steganography
approach is adopted. Three were considered in this thesis: (i) APS (ii) ICS and
(iii) TLCSS. In the case of APS it was found that the standard deviation of the
position changes count worked well as did APCC. In the case of ICS it was found
that the frequency distributions of space character segments could be usefully em-
ployed. Finally in the case if TLCSS the proposed tag variance measure was found
to produce good results.
2. “How can steganography detection effectiveness be measured so that different tech-
niques can be assessed and compared to one another?”. Two different steganograhy
detection contexts were considered: (i) the dynamic (monitoring) context and (ii)
the static (non-monitoring) context. In the first case the idea presented was to
adopt a mechanism to identify a webpage steganography detection threshold. Af-
ter that measures such as True Positives (TP) and False Negatives (FN) could be
used to assess a steganography detection mechanism. In the second case the main
idea presented was to adopt a classification approach. Measures typically used to
evaluate supervised learning techniques were adopted. The used measures were: (i)
Accuracy and (ii) Area Under the Receiver Operator Characteristic Curve (AUC).
In the case of TLCSS detection as in the case of detecting APS in the monitoring
context the detection rate True Positives (TP) and False Negatives (FN) rate were
used.
3. “Given a set of webpages how should the content of those webpages be represented
so as to facilitate, dynamic or static, steganography detection?”. The resolution
to this question proved straight-forward. The answer, as in the case of the answer
to subsidiary Question 1 above, is that this depended on the nature of the HTML
steganography under consideration: (i) APS, (ii) ICS or (iii) TLCSS. In the case of
APS we only need to consider the attributes that appear in webpages. These were
therefore represented using either the standard deviation of their positions as in
Chapter 3 or by a feature vector of their positions changes count as in Chapter 4.
In case of ICS the entire webpage of interest needed to be considered, and thus was
represented by a feature vector of white space segment frequency distributions. In
case of TLCSS we only needed to consider the tags that appear in webpages.
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4. “Given a solution to the above, how can the performance of such techniques be
best improved so as to maximize effectiveness?. From the foregoing, at least for
static steganography, detection using feature selection maximized the effectiveness.
Parameter tuning was also important.
5. “What is the most appropriate mechanism for webpage monitoring in the context
of dynamic steganography detection?”. Monitoring was considered in detail in
Chapter 3. The fundamental idea presented was to repeatedly consider snapshots
of a webpage of interest, separated by a time intervals in a period of time. This
seemed to work well as indicated in the reported evaluation with respect to learning
a webpage steganography detection threshold.
6. “What is the effect on detection of the nature of messages that are hidden (English
language or random)?”. The reported evaluation results, using both English lan-
guage and random messages (the later simulating encrypted messages), indicated
that whether a hidden messages was a natural English language text or a random
one had no effect with respect to the operation of the proposed steganography
detection techniques.
7. “What is the effect on detection of the length of messages that are hidden?”. The
evaluation conducted using messages of different length reported on in the previous
four chapters, indicated that the length of a hidden message had a significant
influence on the effectiveness of detection.
Returning to the overriding research question in Chapter 1 “What are the most appro-
priate detection approaches, dynamic and static, required to efficiently and effectively
detect hidden messages in HTML files?” it can be concluded that for HTML steganog-
raphy detection in the dynamic context that the proposed SD algorithm was effectively
a mechanism whereby the steganography detection threshold for a particular webpage
could be learnt. In the case of HTML steganography detection in the static context the
work presented in this thesis clearly indicates that the both proposed APCC and DIC
approaches, coupled with appropriate classification techniques, could clearly distinguish
between stego and clean webpages in a way that was effective. Also proposed TV ap-
proach was an alternative enhancement of the approach of Huang et. al to detect very
short messages in the (non-monitoring) static context.
It is found that detection of HTML attribute permutation steganography APS mech-
anism is more attractive than other HTML steganography mechanisms. This is because
APS still difficult to discover as it does not neither cause increasing of the carrier object
size as in ICS nor it can be suspicious from the source code as in TLCSS.
Finally, to complete the main findings reported on in this section, the contributions
of the research presented in this thesis (originally itemized in Chapter 1) are presented
again here for completeness:
1. The SD approach to detect APS in the dynamic (monitoring) context.
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2. The APCC approach also directed at the detection of APS detection in the static
(non-monitoring) context.
3. The DIC approach to detect ICS in the static (non-monitoring) context.
4. The TV approach to detect TLCSS in the static (non-monitoring) context.
7.4 Future work
The research described in this thesis has suggested a number potential areas for future
work. This thesis is thus concluded with an itemization of these potential future research
directions:
• Alternative HTML steganography methods: A number of established HTML steganog-
raphy methods were investigated with respect to the work presented in this thesis.
It would be interesting to investigate the detection of further alternative steganog-
raphy methods, such as hiding data using links and scripts.
• Alternative datasets: The proposed approaches in this thesis have been tested
using small size datasets. A much more comprehensive evaluation is therefore
desirable.
• A universal HTML steganography detection technique: The proposed approaches
in this thesis have each been designed to detect a particular steganography HTML
method. A universal HTML steganography detection technique is desirable to
detect all forms of HTML steganography. This could also then be applicable to
HTML steganography mechanisms of the future. How this would operate is unclear
at present, but some form of machine learning approach might be appropriate.
• We can also consider the perspective of the steganographer and examine ways,
given knowledge of the techniques presented in this thesis, whereby detection can
be avoided!

Appendix A
Evaluation Datasets
This appendix presents a description of the datasets used for evaluation purposes with
respect to the work presented in this thesis. The techniques presented in this thesis
are divided between techniques for static non-monitoring steganography detection, and
dynamic monitoring steganography detection.
In total four distinct HTML Steganography detection mechanisms were proposed in this
thesis:
• Statistical Detection (SD) was directed at Attribute Permutation Steganography
(APS) in the monitoring context.
• Attribute Position Changes Count (APCC) was directed at Attribute Permutation
Steganography (APS) in the non-monitoring context.
• Detect Invisible Characters (DIC) was directed at Invisible Characters Steganog-
raphy (ICS), again in the non-monitoring context.
• Tag Variance (TV) was directed at Tag Letter Case Switching Steganography
(TLCSS) also in the non-monitoring context.
Whatever the case each dataset was half seeded with one of HTML steganography
mechanisms and constructed using a standard process as shown in Figure A.1 to produce
stego-webpages. From the figure it can be seen that a four steps process was adopted.
This process commenced by collecting a set of webpages (webpages collection was for the
period of 1/7/2015 to 7/7/2015) . In the case of static (non-monitoring) steganography
detection one webpage per web site was collected, in the case of dynamic (monitoring)
steganography a sequence of webpages was collected with respect to each site. The
next step in the process was to generate the messages to be hidden. Two categories
of message generation were considered: (i) natural English language messages and (ii)
random messages made up of mixtures of uppercase and lowercase letters, symbols
and numbers. At the same time, for each category, messages of different length were
considered. The prepared messages were then used to seeded the collected webpages
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Figure A.1: Stego-webpages generation process
using one of the selected HTML steganography methods: (i) APS, (ii) ICS and (iii)
TLCSS.
A summary of the datasets generated is presented in Table A.1. The table gives: (i)
the size of each dataset in terms of number of webpages, (ii) the HTML steganography
mechanism used for the “seeding”. Seven mechanisms were used in total: (i) Shen et.
al [81], (ii) Deogol [80] (iii) Huang et. al [45] (iv) wbstego4open [91] (v) SNOW [60] (vi)
Sui and Luo [87] and (vii) Shen Y. [96]. The first three for APS, the fourth and fifth for
ICS and the last two for TLCSS.
Table A.1: Summary of generated evaluation datasets
Dataset Dataset size Steganography seeding mechanisms
(wepages no.)
Monitoring 400 (APS) Shen et. al, Deogol and Huang et. al
Non-Monitoring 150 (APS) Shen et. al, Deogol, Huang et. al ,
(ICS) wbstego4open, SNOW, (TLCSS) Sui and Luo and Shen Y.
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A.1 Monitoring dataset
The Monitoring dataset was used to evaluate the proposed Statistical Detection (SD)
monitoring approach presented in this thesis (Chapter 3). In this approach the idea
was to monitor the presence of APS in HTML files using an attribute position standard
deviation mechanism. This dataset, was generated for monitoring purposes; in other
words, for each website considered, a sequence of samples of the website landing page
was collected at intervals of time τ over a period of time T . For the evaluation the
compiled dataset consisted of 10 well-known landing webpages:
• www.bbc.co.uk.
• www.nytimes.com (New York Times).
• www.wikipedia.org.
• www.stackoverflow.com.
• www.sony.com.
• www.liverpool.ac.uk (The University of Liverpool).
• www.ieee.org.
• www.webmd.com.
• www.microsoft.com.
• www.amazon.com.
These were all landing pages that were updated frequently. For each landing page 40
snapshots were collected at an interval of τ = 2 hours over a period of seven consecutive
days. The total final number of downloaded webpages was therefore 400 (10× 40).
The adopted steganography seeding mechanism was as follows: a message was em-
bedded in thirty out of the 40 snapshots for each webpage. The Standard Deviation
(St.D) values of the attributes position change were calculated before and after embed-
ding so that the detection threshold could be learned . The last 10 webpage were used
for steganography detection (half seeded and half unseeded). Hidden messages were
seeded using the Shen et. al [81], Deogol [80] and Huang et. al [45] mechanisms. Var-
ious lengths for the hidden messages were considered from 10% to 100%, incrementing
in steps of 10%, of Maximum webpage Embedding Capacity (MEC).
A.2 Non-Monitoring dataset
This dataset was used to evaluate three HTML steganography detection approaches in
non-monitoring context. These approaches were:
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• The Attribute Position Changes Count (APCC) approach to detecting APS, more
details in Chapter 4.
• The Detect Invisible Characters approach (DIC) to detecting ICS, more details in
Chapter 5.
• The Tag Variance (TV) approach to detecting TLCSS , more details in Chapter
6.
This dataset also included the 10 landing pages used to construct the Monitoring
dataset. The webpages included in the dataset can be loosely categorized according to
“ the topic”, five topics were identified: (i) education, (ii) entertainment, (iii) business,
(iv) health and (v) news. Figure A.2 shows the distribution of topics across the dataset.
From the figure it can be seen that: 61 webpages were concerned with the education
(such as universities and schools), 32 with entertainment (such as sport, games and
music), 21 with business, 18 with health (such as nutrition, fitness and medical centers)
and 18 with news sites.
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Figure A.2: Distribution of webpages topics for the Non-Monitoring dataset
Subsections A.2.1 to A.2.3 give more details on how the Non-Monitoring dataset was
used to evaluate HTML steganography proposed approaches in non-monitoring context
in this thesis: APCC, DIC and TV in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
A.2.1 Non-Monitoring Dataset usage for APCC Evaluation
To evaluate the APCC approach in Chapter 4 the Non-Monitoring dataset was prepared
as follows: the webpages were half seeded with hidden messages using the Shen et. al [81],
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Deogol [80] and Huang et. al [45] mechanisms. Various lengths for the hidden messages
were considered from 10% to 100%, incrementing in steps of 10%, of Maximum webpage
Embedding Capacity (MEC).
A.2.2 Non-Monitoring Dataset usage for DIC Evaluation
To evaluate DIC approach in 5, the Non-Monitoring dataset was used as follows: the
webpages were half seeded with hidden messages using ICS tools presented in Chapter
2, namely: (i) wbstego4open [91] and (ii) SNOW [60]. Messages of different length were
again embedded, although in this case message length was defined in terms of a number
of characters instead of a percentage of the MEC. The reason for this was that the
ICS tools used provided a high embedded capacity so a relative increment of a hidden
message length (for example 30%, 40%. . . . , 100%) with respect to the MEC would
result in very long messages that can be easily detected. Thus messages of lengths of
between 20 and 100 characters, incrementing in steps of 20 characters, were used.
A.2.3 Non-Monitoring Dataset usage for TV Evaluation
To evaluate TV approach described in Chapter 6. The Non-Monitoring dataset was used
as follows: the webpages were half seeded with hidden messages using TLCSS methods,
namely: (i) Sui and Luo [87] and (ii) Shen Y. [96] (both described previously in Chapter
2). Again messages of different length were considered, defined in terms of a percentage
of the MEC, however in this case the lengths considered were from 2% to 10% of the
MEC incrementing in steps of 2%. The reason for this incrementing was to investigate
the TV approach effectiveness to detect very short messages.

Appendix B
Wilcoxon-signed rank test
This appendix presents the steps for computing the Wilcoxon-signed rank test statistics
W that is used in this thesis.
The Wilcoxon-signed rank test is used to test for the median differences. The test
statistics W can be obtained using the following steps:
1. State the null hypothesis - in this case it is that the median difference, M, is equal
to zero.
2. Calculate each paired difference, di = xi-yi, where xi , yi are the pairs of observa-
tions.
3. Rank the dis, ignoring the signs (i.e. assign rank 1 to the smallest absolute value
of di, rank 2 to the next etc.).
4. Label each rank with its sign, according to the sign of yi.
5. Calculate W+, the sum of the ranks of the positive dis, and W-, the sum of the
ranks of the negative dis. (As a check the total, W+ + W-, should be equal to
n(n−1)
2 , where n is the number of pairs of observations in the sample).
6. Choose W = min(W-, W+).
7. Use tables of critical values for the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test to find the
probability of observing a value of W or more extreme. Most tables give both
one-sided and two-sided p-values. If not, double the one-sided p-value to obtain
the two-sided p-value.
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Appendix C
Feature Selection Methods
This appendix presents feature selection methods. There are three general methods of
feature selection: [59]:
• Filter methods: In these methods a rank or score is assigned to each feature and
the top k selected. This ranking can be determined using a variety of statistical
metrics. This rank is assigned according to the correlation of each feature with the
output variable (the class label). Figure C.1 presents the general process adopted
by these methods. Filter methods are frequently independent of any machine
learning algorithm, they are also fast because there is no training as in the case
of Wrapper methods (see below). Examples of these methods include: correlation
coefficient, chi square and information gain.
Figure C.1: Filter methods [55]
• Wrapper methods: In these methods a feature subset is chosen and a particular
model is trained using this subset. Based on the results obtained the relevance of
the features is verified. Various features combinations are considered when using
these methods, not the case with respect to Filter methods. However, searching all
combinations requires high computational time. Figure C.2 presents the general
process adopted by these methods. Examples of these methods include: forward
selection, backward selection [39] and recursive feature elimination [38].
Figure C.2: Wrapper methods [55]
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• Embedded methods: This is where the feature selection is embedded in the
data mining and hence it is no longer a preprocessing method. However, there are
a number of regression methods that use this approach; examples include: LASSO
(Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) regression [30] and RIDGE
regression [61]. Figure C.3 presents the approach of these methods.
Figure C.3: Embedded methods [55]
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